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Richard K. Neumann, Jr.*
A window slowly opens on the shimmer
Of night battling with the rising sky.
Prague, far away, is rosy pink and glimmers.
- Seifert'
I. NOVEMBER
The event was called the Massacre even though no one died. Some
students-marching peacefully down a boulevard and demanding certain
rights not enjoyed in their country for many years-were set upon by
police. The students were armed with nothing. The police had clubs,
tear gas, and dogs, and in their vanguard was a special squad trained to
storm airplanes taken over by terrorists. As they were being surrounded
by all these forces, the students knelt and sang, among other things, "We
Shall Overcome" in their native language. Then the police attacked.
A monument was later erected on the spot, and even now people leave
flowers and lighted candles there daily. It is a bronze sculpture of several
* The author is grateful for the comments and suggestions of Charles R. DiSalvo, Maura C.
Doherty, Stephen Ellmann, Eric M. Freedman, Josef Jarab, Lisa Lerman, Andrew Schepard, and
Philip G. Schrag, as well as the research assistance of Abena Darkeh.
1. J. SEIFERT, MOZART IN PRAGUE (P. Jagasich & T. O'Grady transl. 1985) (rondel VI).
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hands reaching upward-some open to prove that they hold no weapons,
others in the two-finger gesture that conveys a hope for peace. To a pass-
erby unaware of the history of the place, the only explanation is an
engraved date: November 17, 1989.
That was a Friday. The next day a few thousand students held a hesi-
tant demonstration, and stage theaters began to strike. Museums and the
philharmonic soon followed. On Sunday, ten thousand people demon-
strated. On the same day, a group of activists met in a theater down the
street from the site of the Massacre, and Civic Forum was formed. On
Monday, 200,000 people-largely students and other young people-
assembled in the heart of the city, and that night students shut down the
university. The leader of the Party in power accused the organizers of
this demonstration of trying to drag the country into "chaos and anar-
chy." But Civic Forum announced plans for a nation-wide two-hour
general strike to occur a week later-a strike that would fail unless the
blue-collar class were to join it. The workers had never taken part in
anything like this before, and the whole idea seemed nearly quixotic.
Students went through telephone books and other directories and
developed a computerized list of nearly all the factories in the country.
Student volunteers were organized into teams, coordinated by computer,
and dispatched to the factories, sometimes joined by actors. Some were
assaulted as soon as they arrived by workers who were loyal to the
regime or who feared the kind of economic disintegration that was then
happening in Poland.2 Management was determined to keep the students
out of the factories, and students often had to be smuggled onto the
premises.
"Your own children are being beaten or will soon be beaten," the stu-
dents told the workers. Some of your children are among us in Prague.
And those who are not will eventually be beaten right here because if the
regime can do this to us in Prague, they will do it to young people any-
where. We want the officials responsible for this found out and brought
to justice. And we want to make sure that this will never happen again.
2. In East Central Europe, "[w]orkers tend to react to the idea of economic reform with a
wariness rooted in natural conservatism and reinforced by a lack of information" and by a refusal
"to jeopardize security and stability for the sake of greater but also riskier material gains." Pravda,
Industrial Workers: Patterns of Dissent, Opposition, and Accommodation in OPPOSITION IN
EASTERN EUROPE 209, 216 (R. Tokes ed. 1979). When the prior regimes in that region considered
even timid economic reforms in earlier years, the workers usually reacted with suspicion and with
demands for the continuation or reimposition of rigid centralized planning. Id. at 216-18. Workers
were especially hostile to any change that might tie "wages to enterprise performance or
profitability," allow prices to rise according to market conditions, or reduce featherbedding (and
thus introduce the possibility of unemployment). Id. at 217. Arguments that any of these things
could cause economic efficiency were heard by the workers to mean that they would be required "to
work harder to earn the same wages." Id. "Modest price increases of the order of three per cent
[were] greeted with alarm," id., and for several decades in Poland significantly greater increases
usually led to riots. "As one Czech worker put it in 1968, only fools would exchange security for the
unknown." Id. at 216.
[Vol. 3: 15 7
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(Often, these arguments were supplemented with videotapes of the Mas-
sacre, copied en masse from a few originals.)
Although these presentations deeply affected the workers, the initial
response was disappointing. The workers believed that nothing could be
changed for the better; they feared that a breakdown of the regime would
lead to economic chaos; and they forcefully told all this to the students.
Imagine these scenes: students who a week before had been sitting in
classes without any intention of making an uprising were now standing
on shop floors, trying to persuade crowds of workers to take an action
that would be treated as the equivalent of treason. The workers peppered
these students with counter-arguments and skeptical questions, which
the students had to be able to answer convincingly on the spot. The
students could hardly afford to be unpersuasive: they all knew that if this
strike failed, they themselves would be dismissed from the university and
blacklisted from all work except manual labor, and many of them would
be imprisoned.
When workers reiterated the regime's argument-which was being
broadcast on television and radio-that the students were trying to
destroy the economy, a student might walk over to the nearest machine
and ask, "How old is this? The plaque on it says it was made in 1957.
When it was new, how old were each of you? How many shifts do you
work in this factory? One? When is the last time this factory had
enough work for two shifts? Can any of you remember when you
worked three shifts? The regime is the one that is destroying the econ-
omy. They don't give you the equipment you need to do the job, and
then they can't sell enough of your product to keep you fully employed.
Production is falling in other factories, too, although the regime is trying
to hide that from you. They will lie to you to stay in power. They
caused these problems, and now they can't solve them. That is why the
only way to prevent economic chaos is to join our strike."
In one of the largest industrial complexes in the country, an official of
the regime was filmed lecturing to hundreds of workers on the theme of
the naivet6 of student agitators. The workers were wearing overalls and
the like, and the official, in a suit, spoke from an imperious balcony high
above them. In the past, when the regime's representatives had spoken
from platforms or balconies like this, they were accustomed to respectful
silence, and when they were finished, certain members of the audience
would rise and promise that everyone would make extra efforts to meet
the regime's production goals or to do whatever else the regime wanted
of them. But this time the workers erupted with cries of "You're naive!
You're naive!" In shock and bewilderment, the official stepped backward
and looked into the camera helplessly as the workers chanted "Resign!
Resign!"
In Prague, the demonstrations were growing larger. They began at
1991]
3
Neumann: From an Insurrection
Published by Yale Law School Legal Scholarship Repository, 1991
Yale Journal of Law & the Humanities
four in the afternoon so that working people could protest on the way
home. On Tuesday, the fourth day after the Massacre, 200,000 people
demonstrated. On Wednesday and Thursday, 250,000. On Friday,
350,000. On Saturday, in bitter cold, 500,000 to 800,000-a third to a
half of the city's population. And on Sunday, the day before the general
strike was to occur, 500,000. There was not a single instance of a protes-
tor's committing even the smallest act of violence, and consequently the
police became confused. In a vague way, they recognized the moral force
of the demonstrators' peacefulness, but they had no strategy that could
respond to it. After the Massacre, the police generally refrained from
beating people, but when they came across small groups of protestors,
they arrested everyone they could (although for lack of cells the arrestees
were likely to be released after a few hours). Six or seven days after the
Massacre, even the arrests stopped, and the police seemed to recede
entirely. During the week of huge demonstrations, the regime tried to
contain the situation by replacing the Party general secretary and the
bulk of the politburo, but the demonstrators were already demanding
more: abolition of required courses in Marxist-Leninist thought, an end
to the Party's leading role, free elections.
At the university,' students had formed strike committees and had
occupied the main buildings, bringing sleeping bags with them. Because
so much had to be done so quickly, and because of the risk that the police
might mount a surprise attack in the middle of the night, students were
at work twenty-four hours a day. They had the support and assistance of
many teachers scattered throughout the university, generally more often
in the arts (such as drama) and in fields without political content (such as
mathematics) than in fields which the regime had treated as ideological
(such as law).
Signs proclaiming "General Strike" began to appear in windows every-
where, in homes, shops, and offices-even government offices. The strike
began at noon on Monday, November 27, and it was clear within minutes
that the entire country had been shut down. Not a thing was being man-
ufactured, sold, or repaired anywhere. And in the succeeding two hours,
workplaces were scenes of exuberant civil disobedience. Workers made
speeches to their colleagues, and protest songs were sung. Revolutionary
documents were read aloud. In a Prague brewery-and probably in a lot
of other places as well-someone stood on a platform and read from the
3. What Americans sometimes call the University of Prague is actually Charles University,
founded in 1348 by its namesake, Charles IV, and one of the oldest universities in Europe. There are
also universities in Bratislava, Brno, and Olomouc, all of which were also quickly shut down. The
last time any of these institutions had been closed for political reasons was in 1939, by the Nazis, in
reprisal for student protests against the occupation. (Except for Bratislava, they were closed
throughout the war.) In November 1939, the Nazis executed a number of student leaders, and the
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American Declaration of Independence about "certain inalienable
Rights" among them "Life, Liberty, and the Pursuit of Happiness." On
the following day, the regime surrendered and began to transfer power to
Civic Forum.
II. BEFORE NOVEMBER
Americans tend to section their political memories into four-year--or,
in the case of reelected presidents--eight-year intervals that come and go
with the reliability of the natural seasons. No such rhythm exists in the
political memories of countries that lack an unbroken history of regularly
scheduled elections. Instead, a static line of existence is punctuated not
by routine rotations of officeholders, but instead by cataclysmic events
that are recalled by specific dates or by names intended to convey an
interpretation (and often used for ironic effect even by those who hold
contrary views). Thus, Czechs and Slovaks divide their recent past into
that which existed before November 17 and that which has existed after-
ward. The period that ended on November 17 began with "the February
events" of 1948, and its only interval of hope was cut short by the "entry
of the fraternal armies" in August, 1968 and the "normalization" which
followed.
After the entry of the fraternal armies, there were several months of
borrowed time in which people continued to have the option of speaking
and acting freely but knew that their behavior was being observed. Dur-
ing the same period, the Party leadership was quietly examined and
purged. Once in place, the new leadership conducted what it called
"normalization": every person known to have actively supported the
reforms of the Prague Spring was gradually removed from any job in
which he or she might be able to harm the cause of socialism.
The normalizers were quick to dismiss people with "independence of
mind, generosity, tolerance, excessive education, high moral principles,
aversion to officialese, courage, and so on."' 4 Scholars, journalists, and
managers were reduced to washing windows for a living or doing con-
struction work or carrying tourists' suitcases in hotels,5 creating vacan-
cies to be filled by people distinguished for their "obedience, loyalty,
4. M. SIMECKA, THE RESTORATION OF ORDER: THE NORMALIZATION OF CZECHOSLOVAKIA
1969-76, at 41 (1984).
5. This was the second mass purge in modem Czechoslovak history. The first, in 1948 and
succeeding years, was worse: anyone from a bourgeois background was forced out of responsible
work. This was taken to such an extreme that the children of shopkeepers were not allowed to
attend university. During the years 1948-50, 13% of the university professors and 6% of the docents
were purged, but among law school teachers (of all ranks) the figure exceeded 90%. Z. KRYSTUFEK,
THE SOVIET REGIME IN CZECHOSLOVAKIA 100 (1981). "Some of [their replacements] did not have
any legal or other university education," although they were, of course, ideologically pure. Id. For
many years before 1989, nearly all of the teachers at the law school in Prague had been members of
the Party in power. Not all Party members actively supported the regime; some joined because
membership was expected of them. Students tended to distinguish not between Party and non-Party
teachers, but instead between those who were "compromised" and those who were not.
1991]
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dependability, mediocrity, respectability, caution, [and] moral weak-
ness." 6  "An era of apathy and widespread demoralization began....
Society was atomized, small islands of resistance were destroyed, and a
disappointed and exhausted public pretended not to notice. Independent
thinking and creation retreated to the trenches of deep privacy. ' ' 7 What
fluorished was "passivity, opportunism,... cynicism, [and] an exclusive
concern with cultivating such 'private' concerns as career and family
life." 8
A small but significant number of able and principled people survived
in what became known as the "grey area": through one stratagem or
another (and often through accident9), they were able to remain in
responsible positions without compromising themselves. Some came of
age after the normalizers had become less vigilant; others worked in
fields considered so innocuous that the normalizers gave them a more
cursory examination.
In the universities, normalization produced a large group of teachers10
who had only the shallowest understanding of their subjects: not only
were they unable to add to their field's body of theory, but it was clear
even to students that many of them did not know some of the basic
descriptive material to be found in textbooks. And the normalizers were
particularly diligent at cleansing law school faculties. Law, after all, is
full of political content, and thought about law was therefore always kept
under tight control. Law students were required to take courses entitled
"Marxist Philosophy," "Marxism-Leninism," "Scientific Communism,"
6. SIMECKA, supra note 4, at 41.
7. V. HAVEL, DISTURBING THE PEACE 119-20 (1990). East Central Euopeans call such a
retreat "internal emigration."
8. Keane, Editor's Preface to V. HAVEL, THE POWER OF THE POWERLESS: CITIZENS AGAINST
THE STATE IN CENTRAL-EASTERN EUROPE 8 (J. Keane ed. 1985). (Together with so much lying
that "living the truth" later became a revolutionary slogan; this is the still-debilitating wound that
East Central Europeans call "the degradation of values.")
It was not the tanks and infantry of the fraternal armies that crushed ... the Czechoslovak
people's aspiration to a democratic way of life, but the bureaucrats in charge of personal files at
every level, who wielded the power to issue dismissal notices, reorganize or redeploy the work
force [and] provide damning character references. . . . Everything was carried out virtually
unseen... without arousing large-scale reaction among world public opinion.
SIMECKA, supra note 4, at 66.
9. For example, a person who happened to be out of the country doing research during the
critical months in 1968 would not have had an opportunity to commit the kinds of acts that would
have attracted the attention of the normalizers.
10. To Europeans, the words professor and faculty do not mean what they do to us, and in this
article the word teachers is used instead when discussing European universities. In Europe, a faculty
is an academic department, and a law faculty is a law school's entirety as an institution (and not
merely its teachers). In most countries, only a very small proportion of those teaching in universities
are professors. Non-professorial teachers hold titles such as docent, and many have the equivalent of
tenure. In Europe the word professor has connotations of personal authority and empire-building
that can evoke strong political reactions. In some countries, particularly Germany, a professor is a
person around whom the teaching and scholarship of other teachers is organized. See Neave &
Rhoades, The Academic Estate in Western Europe in THE ACADEMIC PROFESSION 211, 215 (B.
Clark ed. 1987); UNIVERSITIES, POLITICIANS AND BUREAUCRATS: EUROPE AND THE UNITED
STATES, passim (E. Shils & H. Daalder ed. 1982) [hereinafter, UNIVERSITIES].
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"Scientific Atheism, .... Defense of the Socialist State," and "History of
the International Communist Movement and of the Communist Party of
Czechoslovakia."'" In the regime's early years, the classroom teaching
of law was so politicized that students played a game like one sometimes
played in American law schools: "Each participant chose a word he
expected the teacher to repeat most often during [class]. The favorite
horses were 'comrades,' 'world peace,' 'exploitation,' 'socialism,' 'com-
munism,' 'capitalism,' 'class struggle,' and 'class enemy.' . . . Once I
wagered on 'socialism.' The lecturer used the word seventy-two times,
but I still lost by two points to a classmate who had backed
'comrades.' 
"12
Before the regime came to power in 1948, Czechoslovak universities
had operated in the mainstream of the Central and Western European
traditions of higher education. Among all the changes introduced there-
after was one from the Russian tradition that is not well understood in
the West: the research and theorizing function of the university was sep-
arated from the teaching function and diverted to a parallel system of
institutes centered around the Czechoslovak Academy of Sciences.' 3 A
university teacher was only a teacher-to the exclusion, if necessary, of
scholarly interests. Although a teacher was not flatly prohibited from
publishing, the resulting material was hardly voluminous, and among
teachers favored by the regime it rarely rose above the level of the
descriptive. "4
11. For the complete curriculum, see Glos, Czechoslovakia in 8 MODERN LEGAL SYSTEMS
CYCLOPEDIA 87, 97-98 (K. Redden ed. 1985). For a similar curriculum, used before 1990 in all East
German law schools, see D. MEADOR, IMPRESSIONS OF LAW IN EAST GERMANY: LEGAL
EDUCATION AND LEGAL SYSTEMS IN THE GERMAN DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC 72-88, 238-43 (1986).
12. 0. ULC, THE JUDGE IN A COMMUNIST STATE 6 (1972).
13. The Soviet Academy of Sciences, on which the Czechoslovak Academy was modelled, is
descended from the St. Petersburg Academy of Science, founded in 1725 by Peter the Great to
stimulate Russia to catch up technologically with the West. A. VUCINICH, EMPIRE OF
KNOWLEDGE: THE ACADEMY OF SCIENCES OF THE USSR 6-17 (1984). For similar purposes, the
Soviets later invested enormous resources in their Academy, id. at ix, 123-313, and encouraged their
client governments in other countries to do something similar. When the Soviets refer to someone as
"Academician Sakharov" or "Academician Lysenko," they do not mean that he or she is a scholar-
teacher in a university; the honorific means instead that its holder is a member of the Academy and
therefore employed full-time on Academy research. The institutes under the umbrella of the
Czechoslovak Academy include many that are concerned with fields not considered "scientific" in
the West. They include institutes on-among other things-literature, history, art, ancient cultures,
philosophy, and law.
14. Although a similar Academy structure was used in East Germany, university teachers there
continued to do research because of the strong German tradition of university scholarship - the
same tradition that in the last century inspired the American concept of a university, see R.
HOFSTADTER & W. METZGER, THE DEVELOPMENT OF ACADEMIC FREEDOM IN THE UNITED
STATES 367-412 (1955). But East German university teachers were not free to pursue whatever
research interests pleased them. They were assigned research topics "pursuant to a centrally devised
state plan." MEADOR, supra note 11, at 96, 98. The Ministry for East German Higher Education
formulated a different research plan for each law school, coordinated to produce data needed for the
"realization of socialism," and every law teacher was expected to devote about 30 per cent of his or
her professional time to fulfilling the law school's research plan. Id. at 96-97. Any research outside
the plan would have to be done at night and on weekends and, because it would have been unofficial,
would not be favored for publication. Id. at 97.
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After normalization was complete, a person in the grey area still
attached to an institute had a reasonable chance of surviving indefi-
nitely-as long as he or she did not try to publish anything that would
alarm the regime. Most of the work in an institute would be done alone
or with a limited number of colleagues, and that made safety easier to
obtain. But a Czechoslovak university teacher typically lectures in the
classroom up to twenty hours a week, and in any given class some stu-
dents might be quite ready to report a teacher's inadvertent indiscretion
to the secret police."5
III. AFTER NOVEMBER
In December, university committees were formed to restructure cur-
ricula. It would not have been enough merely to have deleted the
mandatory courses in Marxism-Leninism. In every field that conceivably
could have had ideological content, the regime had distorted the avail-
able body of thought, teaching what it liked-often with preposterous
interpretations-and ignoring or lying about the rest. Not only did some
courses have to be deleted, but others needed to be added and still others
redesigned. Even after the Marxism-Leninism courses had been elimi-
nated, each remaining required course was reexamined to see whether it
should become optional, and distribution requirements had to be simi-
larly reworked.
At least in Prague, these committees were composed of teachers and
students in equal numbers and with equal voting rights. They could not
spend years on this work, as such committees do in the United States.
People who have risked their futures in an insurrection have no patience
for the glacial pace that American academics wrongly assume to be
inherent in collegial decision-making. Much-but not all-of the curric-
ular reform had to be and was accomplished before students returned in
January from the break between academic terms.
As East Central European teachers and scholars reestablish complete
intellectual ties with the West (a gradual process which will take several
years), their curricula will have to go through a profound evolution. In
Czechoslovak law schools, for example, even those aspects of law that
the regime considered nonpolitical will have to be overhauled because
they have been and still are taught in the purest kind of formalism and
legal positivism-without any of the interdisciplinary insights that began
with legal realism. 6
15. M. Prochazka, Denunciation as a Literary Genre, paper delivered at the NYU Conf. on
Czech Lit. & Culture, (Mar. 21, 1990). See infra note 148. Even well-meaning students cotld feel
that they were being put in a terrible position if a teacher were to say, in their presence, something
arguably subversive: Was this a "provocation" (an event staged to test how they would react)? If
they failed to inform on the teacher, were their own futures in jeopardy?
16. See infra notes 66-67 and accompanying text. Because Czechoslovak law teachers and
lawyers have virtually no knowledge of any of the intellectual movements that have stirred up
[Vol. 3: 157
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European universities are headed by rectors, rather than by presidents
or chancellors. By long-standing tradition throughout Europe, rectors
are elected for terms of office, usually by a representative body-such as
an academic senate-which is the primary source of university govern-
ance. 17  In most countries, rectors are not imposed from above by a
board of non-scholar trustees or regents. 18 The tradition of electing rec-
tors had not been observed by the regime, and after the November upris-
Anglo-American legal education for many years, attempts by an American to describe clinical
education, feminist jurisprudence, law and literature, and the like can lead to conversations that are
indescribably surreal and bittersweet.
17. Depending on the country, the representative body might in turn be elected by senior
teachers, by all teachers, or by teachers and students. See the following:
Belgium: Verhoeven, Linguistic Communalism, Bureaucratisation and Democratization in
UNIVERSITIES, supra note 10, at 125, 153-54.
Britain: MOODIE & EUSTACE, POWER AND AUTHORITY IN BRITISH UNIVERSITIES (1974).
(British terminology and governance structure differ from that used on the contintent, but the net
effect is comparable. Although British universities have chancellors, their "position is very largely
... ceremonial." Id. at 91. The real chief executive officer of a British university is the vice-
chancellor, who is customarily chosen by a joint committee of the academic senate and the university
council. Id. at 56-57, 103, 126-53. Even on the university council, teachers are not only represented
but are customarily deferred to by the lay members. Id. at 36-38.)
Denmark: Pedersen, State and University-from Coexistence to Collision in UNIVERSITIES, supra
note 10, at 233, 252.
Finland: Pesonen, The One Man-One Vote Issue in UNIVERSITIES, supra note 10, at 365, 367-68.
France: H. COHEN, ELUSIVE REFORM: THE FRENCH UNIVERSITIES, 1968-78, at 55, 106-7, 163
(1978); Salmon, The Loi d'Orientation and Its Aftermath, in UNIVERSITIES, supra note 10, at 63, 73-
74; Carreau, Toward "Student Power" in France?, 17 AM. J. COMP. L. 359, 361, 366 (1969). To an
unusual extent, French universities are ministry controlled. COHEN, supra, at 163-71; Bourricard,
The Prelude to the Loi d'Orientation of 1968, in UNIVERSITIES, supra note 10, at 31, 31-32.
Germany: Geck, Student Power in West Germany, 17 AM. J. CoMP. L. 337, 343 (1969); Hennis,
Legislators and the Universities in UNIVERSITIES, supra note 10, at 1, 18.
Italy: B. CLARK, ACADEMIC POWER IN ITALY 66-67 (1977); Mancini, Student Power in Italy, 17
AM. J. COMP. L. 371, 375 (1969).
The Netherlands: Daalder, Universities Between the "New Democracy" and the "New
Management" in UNIVERSITIES, supra note 10, at 173, 175
Norway: Midgaard, The Interplay of Local and Central Decisions in UNIVERSITIES, supra note 10,
at 275, 289; Selvig & Hambro, Student Representation in Norwegian University Government, 18 AM.
J. CoMp. L. 169, 169 (1970).
Sweden: Ruin, External Control and Internal Participation-Trends in Swedish Higher Education,
in UNIVERSITIES, supra note 10, at 329, 338, 340.
Yugoslavia: Jovanovic, Participation of Students in Administration of Colleges and Universities in
Yugoslavia, 18 AM. J. COMP. L. 172, 175 (1970).
18. In Britain, a university corporation consists, by law, of its "officers, faculty, administration,
and students[, who],. . . in effect, are the 'owners' of the institution. In America,... the opposite is
true. The trustees form the corporation, and the members of the administration and faculty, legally,
are their 'employees.'" Hartnett, Trustee Power in America, in POWER AND AUTHORITY:
TRANSFORMATION OF CAMPUS GOVERNANCE 25, 31 (H. Hodgkinson & L. Meeth ed. 1971).
"Most of the business conducted at [council] meetings is dominated by members of the faculty," and
"much of what the British [councils] decide must meet the approval of the faculty senate." Id. at 32.
The European tradition of autonomous and entirely self-governing universities is an ancient one
which has been associated with intellectual freedom since the middle ages. HOFSTADTER &
METZGER, supra note 14, at 6. Except in France, outsiders and non-scholars do not have much
authority over the ongoing operation of a Western European university. In some countries, some lay
people sit on a university's governing body, but (except in Britain) they are minority members-and
their purpose is not to govern but to voice the interests of society as a whole. Each country's
ministry of education has some authority to supervise universities, but (except in France) ministries
tend not to assert on a regular basis the powers routinely exercised by an American board of trustees
or regents and its appointed administrators. See Shils, Great Britain and the United States:
Legislators Bureaucrats and the Universities, in UNIVERSITIES, supra note 10, at 437; Daalder, The
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ing the legal authority to appoint and discharge rectors still resided
exclusively with the government. But the government was now domi-
nated by Civic Forum, and it quickly dismissed all the rectors and deans
in the country. The methods of selecting successors were not uniform
from university to university, but elections, with student participation,
were held in many institutions of higher learning. Regardless of the
method of election, the first new rectors were formally invested on Janu-
ary 19 by Vaclav Havel, who had become president of the country in
December.
At each university, an academic senate was established, and
subordinate senates were established in colleges and schools within the
university. Although all these senates exercise the kind of authority that
in an American law school would be exercised only by the faculty and by
the board of trustees or regents, they were in 1990 composed 45 per cent
of teachers, 45 per cent of students, and 10 per cent of support staff.' 9
In announcing the appointments of new rectors, Havel stated that edu-
cation was one of the aspects of Czechoslovak life that suffered the deep-
est damage under the regime, in part because those teachers with the
most integrity and the best command of their fields had so often been
dismissed. Civic Forum intended to remake university life, perhaps more
quickly and more thoroughly than any other aspect of Czechoslovak
society. The new rectors began by replacing deans, and the new deans
were not always chosen by appointment.
In Prague, the law school is in the old town, next to the river and two
blocks from the oldest synagogue still standing in Europe. After the
departure of the prior dean, the issue became the method of selecting his
Sudden Revolution and the Sluggish Aftermath: a Retrospect since 1968, in UNIVERSITIEs, supra
note 10, at 489.
19. Many Western European universities also include a large bloc of voting students on
governing bodies-in some cases up to one-third of the voting members-although at most
institutions students do not vote on academic appointments. In some western European countries,
support staff also elect voting members of these bodies. See the following:
Denmark: Pedersen, supra note 17, at 253.
Belgium: Verhoeven, supra note 17, at 153, 159-60.
Finland: Pesonen, supra note 17, at 390.
France: COHEN, supra note 17, at 94-99; Carreau, supra note 17, at 365-69.
Germany: Hennis, supra note 17, at 19-20.
The Netherlands: Daalder, supra note 17, at 174.
Norway: Midgaard, supra note 17, at 288-89; Selvig & Hambro, supra note 17, at 169-71.
Sweden: Ruin, supra note 17, at 340, 351.
The high proportion of students in the Czechoslovak senates is unusual but not unique. The 1968
university reforms in France provided students with a similarly large number of seats in university
governing bodies, Carreau, supra note 17, at 365-69; Bourricard, supra note 17, at 32, although when
the reforms took effect, the "student members rapidly discovered how tedious it is to attend meetings
and by the middle of the academic year most of them ceased to attend." Salmon, supra note 17, at
80.
Parity between teachers and students is not likely to last in Czechoslovakia. The Czechoslovak
rectors have recommended that student membership be reduced to 33 per cent, and in future years
the proportion may shrink further as the aura now surrounding students from the November
uprising dissipates. This fits the pattern of 1968 and its aftereffects in Western Europe.
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successor. In so many of these events over that hectic winter, a higher
official-in this case, the new rector-had the authority to make appoint-
ments but nevertheless accepted reasonable selections made by the insti-
tution involved, which were often arrived at through elections. In the
case of the law school, the new dean and the new vice dean were elected2'
in a procedure-probably never to be repeated-in which students were
able to outvote the largest bloc of teachers. No higher authority required
such an electoral formula. It just happened that way in the euphoria and
exuberance of liberation and in the temporary inability of Party-member
teachers to resist student demands.
Although new rectors and deans had been chosen and new curricula
devised, there still were, throughout each university, a great many teach-
ers-in many departments, a majority of teachers-whose competence
was open to question. The solution might strike us as a violation of aca-
demic freedom, but in the end the Czechoslovak government had no
choice. By statute enacted during the spring, academic senates were
given the power to declare teaching posts vacant, and if teachers wished
to be appointed-essentially to their own jobs-they had to apply and be
evaluated,2 regardless of seniority or prior expectations of job security.
In some schools, all teachers were displaced as a group and compelled to
apply for their own jobs. In others, the academic senate declared individ-
ual positions vacant if the professional and moral integrity of the teachers
involved was suspect. This amounted to a revolution made at the same
time from above (by the government and by new university administra-
tors) and from below (by students).
Moral integrity had to be a subject for evaluation, at the very least
because a number of teachers appeared to have informed in the past on
colleagues and students for the secret police. Greater difficulty came
with less offensive conduct-such as lying for the regime's convenience-
that even people in the grey area may have felt compelled to do at one
time or another to protect their livelihoods and their families.22 In all
likelihood, however, the universities will be able to remove only the most
indisputably unfit teachers, who would be discharged anyway under any
reasonable set of procedures. It is impossible to dismiss every compro-
20. Deans are elected also in Denmark, Pedersen, supra note 17, at 253; Germany, Geck, supra
note 17, at 342; Italy, CLARK, supra note 17, at 68-69, and Mancini, supra note 17, at 375; and
Norway, Midgaard, supra note 17, at 289.
21. Thus, entire universities have gone through the anger, insecurity, and recrimination that
some American law school clinics experienced when their law schools abolished old clinical
positions and created new ones after the adoption of Standard 405(e) of the ABA Standards for
Approval of Law Schools.
22. Before November, when a person implied that he or she might not do something the regime
wanted done, the routine response was the threatened loss of a job or a spouse's job or a child's
chances to attend a university, or the threatened denial of permission to build a cottage in the
countryside or to take a vacation in a fraternal socialist country-all of which continually put people
to choices between matters of principle and the welfare of themselves and the people they loved.
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mised teacher: there are so many of them that the country simply does
not have enough qualified replacements.
For a great many teachers, the idea of a career had become inverted.
Before November, skill at academic gamesmanship was the primary
determinant of success.2 3 Then, suddenly, the measure of a teacher's
worth shifted in part to things that are the very opposite of gamesman-
ship, such as loyalty to strongly held moral beliefs and the courage to act
on them when the test came in November. And many compromised
teachers began backpedalling furiously: the kind of personality that
eagerly adapted to the regime tried just as eagerly to adapt to its succes-
sor, provoking in every instance the equivalent of Khrushchev's "When-
were-you-right?" question. The compromised teacher, for example, who
suddenly develops an interest in lecturing about previously banned
authors provokes much the same reaction that Molotov, Malenkov, and
Kaganovich did at a meeting of the Soviet Party Presidium in 1957 when
they voted for the rehabilitation of generals in whose executions they had
concurred during the purges twenty years before. "[D]uring the discus-
sion, Nikita Sergeyevich asked them very quietly but directly: 'When
were you right, then? At the time when you voted on their fate with such
a tragic result, or today when you claim to rehabilitate them? Answer
me, on which occasion were you right?' This plain, straightforward ques-
tion infuriated ... them."24
What kind of people are the compromised? Actually, they are quite
bland and can hardly be picked out of a crowd. They did whatever they
saw other people doing to make their way in the world. We know them
here, too: people who adopt whatever persona is wanted by the organiza-
tion for which they work, who cultivate personal connections instead of
merit, who easily come to terms with the corrupt political culture that
prevails in certain American cities and counties. Those in Czechoslova-
kia merely fastened their careers to a set of arrangements that was
doomed.
IV. RESISTANCE: LAWYERS AND WRITERS
It may have been natural for the intelligentsia2" to assume the leader-
23. In much smaller ways, the same problem occurs in the United States in what David Riesman
has called the "still-adolescent" mentality that is "adept [at] academic intrigue," Riesman,
Introduction to T. VEBLEN, THE HIGHER LEARNING IN AMERICA xvi (1954 ed.)-for example, in
the occasional untenured American teacher who is eager to write on favored topics, say favored
things at faculty meetings, and avoid association with problematic intellectual movements. The very
idea of a career may be antithetical to the principles of a scholarly community.
24. Speech by Y. Furtseva, Verbatim Records of the XXIInd Party Congress, quoted in M.
TATU, POWER IN THE KREMLIN, FROM KHRUSHCHEV TO KOSYGIN 143-44 (1969).
25. Although we tend to use the words intelligentsia and intellectuals interchangeably, they have
quite different meanings. "Intellectuals," Isaiah Berlin has written, "are persons who ... simply
want ideas to be as interesting as possible." Berlin, The State of Europe. Christmas Eve, 1989, 30
GRANTA 148, 148 (1990) (emphasis added). It is enough that one enjoys ideas for their own sake.
In people of maturity and talent, that quality can produce valuable insights, artistic accomplishment,
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ship of this uprising,26 but why was the intelligentsia itself led most
prominently by writers27 to the near exclusion of lawyers? And, before
1968 when they fought First Secretary Novotny2a, why did writers-pri-
marily banned writers29-acquire reputations for moral integrity that
Czechoslovak lawyersa° did not?
or both. Without maturity, it can lead to self-marginalization, as in the self-absorption and self-pity
of the "alienated" intellectual. The original intelligentsia was, however, something quite different:
[a] nineteenth century . . . movement of educated, morally sensitive Russians stirred to
indignation by an obscurantist Church; by a brutally oppressive [Czarist] state indifferent to the
squalor, poverty and illiteracy in which the great majority of the population lived; by a
governing class which they saw as trampling on human rights and impeding moral and
intellectual progress....
The intelligentsia, for the most part, consisted of members of the professions. The best
known were the writers-all the great names (even Dostoyevsky in his younger days) were in
various degrees and fashions engaged in the fight for freedom. It was the descendants of these
people who were largely responsible for making the February Revolution of 1917. Some of its
members who believed in extreme measures took part in the suppression of this revolution and
the establishment of Soviet communism in Russia, and later elsewhere. In due course the
intelligentsia was... systematically destroyed [by the Stalinist apparatus], but it did not wholly
perish.
Id. at 149. Accord THE RUSSIAN INTELLIGENTSIA (R. Pipes, ed. 1961). As it did with so much else
in language, the apparatus corrupted the term so that "the intelligentsia" came to include every
person whose job required a higher education-a category that in any society can encompass a
substantial number of conformists and careerists. See also N. MANDELSTAM, HOPE AGAINST HOPE
230-32, 331-33 (1980) and THE RUSSIAN INTELLIGENTSIA, supra.
26. The intelligentsia had been making trouble for the regime for over a quarter of a century.
See V. KUSIN, THE INTELLECTUAL ORIGINS OF THE PRAGUE SPRING (1971) (the Prague Spring
was the result of a decade of groundwork by the intelligentsia); H. SKILLING, CHARTER 77 AND
HUMAN RIGHTS IN CZECHOSLOVAKIA (1981) (Charter 77 organized by the intelligentsia).
27. In addition "to the traditionally high role conceded by [Czechoslovak] public opinion to the
artist and thinker," writers were the leading opposition in the 1960's. A. FRENCH, CZECH WRITERS
AND POLITICS, 1945-1969, at 386-87 (1982). See also FRENCH, supra, at 250-71, 392; D. HAMSIK,
WRITERS AGAINST RULERS (1971); HAVEL, DISTURBING THE PEACE, supra note 7, at 84-85;
Vaculik, Two Thousand Words to Workers, Farmers, Scientists, Artists, and Everyone in
CZECHOSLOVAKIA: THE PARTY AND THE PEOPLE 261-68 (A. Oxley, A. Pravda & A. Ritchie ed.
1973); K. DAWISHA, THE KREMLIN AND THE PRAGUE SPRING 165-77, 184, 310, 354 (1984).
28. First Secretary of the Czechoslovak Communist Party (replaced by Dubcek, January 1968)
and President of the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic (replaced by Svoboda, March 1968):
notorious, among other things, for declaring that he would not be "bullied by facts," a line that the
young Havel actually succeeded in putting into an anti-bureaucratic play produced while Novotny
was still in power. See V. HAVEL, THE MEMORANDUM 62 (V. Blackwell transl. 1967), and Webb,
Introduction to HAMSIK, supra note 27, at 12.
29. The work of banned writers was widely circulated in samizdat, creating a "typewriter
culture." H. SKILLING, SAMIZDAT AND AN INDEPENDENT SOCIETY IN CENTRAL AND EASTERN
EUROPE 26 (1989). During normalization,
Czechoslovakia [came] to have two literatures: one, an official literature, printed with official
blessing by real publishing houses paying authors royalties, but read by virtually nobody; and a
second, shadow literature, disseminated in typewritten copies, sometimes bound by hand, and
sold through personal contact for a price covering the cost of production. This shadow
literature [was] read eagerly and passed from hand to hand.
Liehm, Foreword to THE WRITING ON THE WALL v, ix (A. Liehm & P. Kussi ed. 1983).
30. The Czechoslovak legal profession is divided into several hundred "advocates" (who work in
"legal advice bureaus") and many thousands of house counsel (who are employed in the legal
departments of hitherto state-owned enterprises). The "advocates" were the only lawyers who could
be retained by the public, and only they are discussed here. (Both parts of the legal profession are
now being privatized. The legal advice bureaus are being reorganized into law firms.) As enterprises
are being converted into entities expected to compete for profit, the legal departments of at least
some will make themselves available for outside work. For a description of Soviet house counsel, see
L. SHELLEY, LAWYERS IN SOVIET WORK LIFE (1984).
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Before the uprising, the bar association was, by statute, authorized to
relieve an advocate "of his duty to respect [a client's confidences] ... if
an important state interest requires that the advocate disclose the rele-
vant facts to a court [or a state] agency.""a In practice, this meant, of
course, that whenever the regime wanted to know what a client had said
to his or her lawyer, it quickly found out. There were also other means
through which the bar was neutralized. Advocates were obligated by
statute to "guide individuals [including clients] toward fulfillment of
their obligations to the State and society, towards respect for the law and
their fellow-citizens, and [to] thereby [further] socialist legal conscious-
ness." 32 Violations of this duty could and did lead to disbarment.
. For example, when some jazz musicians applied for official permission
in 1971 to set up the organization that eventually became the Jazz Sec-
tion of the Czech Musicians' Union, bureaucratic carelessness enabled
them to escape censorship and government appointment of their
chairperson. The Section's publications became outlets for noncon-
formist views and quickly gained large circulations. It even published a
banned novel and "probably the la. gest dictionary of rock music in the
world."'3 3 The regime attempted to close down the Section administra-
tively. When the officers of the Section tried to challenge that action in
court, they were prosecuted, and their lawyer-who advised them to liti-
gate the matter-was disbarred. 4
In addition, advocates were required to work35 in legal advice bureaus
which were each headed by a person responsible, among other things, for
"the ideological, political, and professional education" of the lawyers
under his or her supervision. 6 Applicants for the bar were also screened
for "full civic integrity," which meant that the authorities had to be satis-
fied that they were "dedicated to the socialist system"3 7 or at least willing
to conform.
During normalization, the Writer's Union voted "almost unani-
mously" to refuse to sign the loyalty oath that was required of everyone,
and "[t]he regime reacted by dissolving the union, eliminating its remain-
ing publications, and confiscating its property, including the publishing
31. Act of 29 October 1975 Concerning the Bar, § 7(2). (The entire act is translated at 19 BULL.
CZECHOSLOVAK L. 248 (1980).)
32. Id. at § 2(2).
33. H. SKILLING, SAMIZDAT, supra note 29, at 81.
34. See Report on Czechoslovakia, REV. INT'L COMM'N. OF JURISTS, No. 38, at 2-3 (1987). See
also SKILLING, SAMIZDAT, supra note 29, at 83. One of the few lawyers who tried to defend a
Charter 77 activist was disbarred and imprisoned for "insulting a magistrate" and "insults to public
officers." Errera, Charter 77 in Czechoslovakia and the International Protection of Human Rights, 13
VAND. J. TRANSNAT. L. 409, 424-25 (1980). Consequently, very few Czech or Slovak lawyers were
willing to defend anyone in political trouble, and even fewer were willing to make active defenses.
See infra note 55 and accompanying text.
35. Act Concerning the Bar, supra note 31, § 21(1).
36. Id. at § 21(2)(d).
37. Id. at § 29.
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plant and offices." 3 But the legal profession and the judiciary acqui-
esced in all the regime's demands, and eventually the legal profession lost
the trust of the public. Some lawyers were in the grey area,39 but the
impression became universal that if one were in political trouble, consult-
ing a lawyer could not possibly help and-because the regime had ready
access to client confidences-would probably make matters worse.40
And the public assumed that every judge had been corrupted by the
Party. 4 Throughout East Central Europe, when a judge was said to
have received "a telephone call" about a pending case, everyone under-
stood from whom the call had come and what its purpose was.42
American lawyers tend to assume that a legal profession is a bulwark
against tyranny, but that may be more the exception than the rule.
Rarely have lawyers formed the vanguard of resistance against a twenti-
eth-century dictatorship.43 And no legal profession has ever done what
the Czechoslovak Writers' Union did during normalization: refuse so
flatly to surrender its integrity that a regime had to destroy it. Not only
do dictatorships quickly find ways of sterilizing their legal professions,
but even when democratic societies have descended into one-party states,
38. Liehm, supra note 29, at viii. A few years later, the regime "organize[d] a new, 'selective'
Union of Czechoslovak Writers," the membership of which consisted of "a handful of old Stalinists
and military officers ... [and] people without talent who gladly set about preventing anyone more
talented than themselves from coming to the fore." Id. at ix.
39. A very, very few were more than that, among them Petr Pithart, who after the revolution
became premier of the Czech republic (the western part of the country); Dagmar Buresova, who
became minister of justice of the Czech republic and then chair of the Czech National Council; and
Jan Carnogursky, who became deputy premier of the federal government and later premier of the
Slovak republic.
40. Vaclav Havel recalls that after he was arrested in 1977 as a leader of the Charter 77
movement, "I was deceived by my interrogators and even by my own defense lawyer." HAVEL,
DISTURBING THE PEACE, supra note 7, at 66 (emphasis added). Some Polish lawyers behaved more
courageously under martial law in the early 1980's. A. SWIDLICKI, POLITICAL TRIALS IN POLAND
1981-1986, at 192-203 (1988). At least four defense lawyers were themselves imprisoned for arguing
in court that the martial law decree was invalid, and disciplinary proceedings were instituted against
at least two more lawyers for the same reason. Id. at 196, 198, 202-3. During the preceding years,
the Polish regime apparently did less than its Czechoslovak counterpart to sterilize the bar-
compare id. at 193 with KRYSTUFEK, supra note 5, at 79-102, 110-27-but the Polish regime quickly
realized its mistake and enacted a new statute intended to tighten its control over the profession,
Swidlicki, supra at 203-13. But even that was far less draconian than the earlier Czechoslovak
efforts, perhaps because of the peculiar ambivalence exhibited by the Polish regime throughout the
1980's. In addition, Solidarity's influence may have so permeated Polish society that no profession
could be immune to it.
41. See generally, ULC, supra note 12. "Faith in the justice of the courts is something quite
foreign .. " SIMECKA, supra note 4, at 101. "It is quite impossible for a judge to be considered a
moral hero in a country where thousands of people are convicted and subsequently rehabilitated as
the victims of unjust trials." Id. at 102.
42. See Frankowski, The Procuracy and the Regular Courts as the Palladium of Individual
Rights-The Case of Poland, 61 TULANE L. REV. 1307, 1327-1335 (1987).
43. Gandhi considered the Hindu and Muslim bar in India to be tools of the British Raj. G.
SHARP, GANDHI AS A POLITICAL STRATEGIST 48-49 (1979). Even though many lawyers were
prominent in the independence movement, Gandhi thought they should all resign from the practice
of law because the Raj "had always been able to retain [its] power through the instrumentality of
lawyers." M. GANDHI, THE LAW AND LAWYERS 126 (S. Kher ed. 1962). The British "always
lookf to the lawyers, however fine fighters they may have been, to preserve their dignity and their
self-respect." Id. at 126-27 (emphasis added). See infra notes 92, 108-10 and accompanying text.
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their legal professions have not, as groups, fought to preserve civic rights.
Instead, in each instance lawyers were quick to adapt to what they saw as
new "realities."
When the rechtsstaat-the German concept of government run by the
detailed letter of the law-gave way to the fihrerstaat, the German
bench and bar raised not the slightest complaint." And when the Nazis
disbarred Jewish lawyers en masse, the remainder of the bar could not
contain its joy over the economic opportunities thereby created.4"
No other professional group protested so feebly against Nazi injus-
tice than.. . the judiciary. Only a few weeks after Hitler had [taken
power in 1933] and abrogated the most important basic rights
enshrined in the Constitution, and only a few days after the Nazis
had terrorized their political opponents, the Confederation of Ger-
man Judges declared 'its full trust in the Government.' Even the
dismissal [from the bench] of their Jewish colleagues . . .was
accepted without protest.... On the whole, judges were wont to
interpret racially discriminatory laws even more extensively than
the regime expected them to.46
Throughout the life of the Weimar Republic, the "anti-democratic beliefs
of a majority of judges provided an unbroken transition to the Nazi
regime."47  And in the Reichstag Fire trial, Dimitrov had to represent
himself because the lawyer assigned to defend him was so anxious not to
offend the Nazis as to become completely ineffectual. Dimitrov cross-
examined Goering and Goebbels--exposing them both as liars-and
according to Hannah Arendt, "it was thanks to him that all those
accused, except van der Lubbe, had to be acquitted."4 Of the five
44. M. LINDER, THE SUPREME LABOR COURT IN NAzI GERMANY: A JURISPRUDENTIAL
ANALYSIS 42-43 (1987); D. RUESCHEMEYER, LAWYERS AND THEIR SOCIETY: A COMPARATIVE
STUDY OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION IN GERMANY AND IN THE UNITED STATES 181-82 (1973).
45. RUESCHEMEYER, supra note 44, at 181-82, 242 n. 97; F. MORSTEIN MARX, GOVERNMENT
IN THE THIRD REICH 129 (1936); Fernandez, The Law, Lawyers and Courts in Nazi Germany, 1 S.
AFR. J. HUMAN RTS. 124, 127-29 (1985); Reifner, The Bar in the Third Reich: Anti-Semitism and
the Decline of Liberal Advocacy, 32 McGILL L.J. 96 (1986). "[I]n 1933 one out of every five
advocates in the German Reich and every other lawyer in Berlin was Jewish." Blankenburg &
Schultz, German Advocates: A Highly Regulated Profession in 2 LAWYERS IN SOCIETY: THE CIVIL
LAW WORLD 124, 147 (R. Abel & P. Lewis ed. 1988). Within two years, the Nazis had disbarred
nearly half the Jewish advocates, and by 1938 there were no Jewish lawyers left in Germany. Id. at
129. The bar itself readily disciplined lawyers who were "inconvenient." Fernandez, supra, at 131-
32. See also Richards, Terror and the Law, 5 HUMAN RTS. Q. 171 (1983) (participation by German
lawyers in state terrorism).
46. Fernandez, supra note 45, at 129-30. Accord R. GRUNBERGER, A SOCIAL HISTORY OF THE
THIRD REICH 22 (1971); H. KOCH, IN THE NAME OF THE VOLK: POLITICAL JUSTICE IN HITLER'S
GERMANY 7 (1989) ("judges ... continued their careers under the Third Reich with scarcely a
murmur of protest").
47. Ehrmann, Judicial Activism in a Divided Society: the Rule of Law in the Weimar Republic in
COMPARATIVE JUDICIAL SYSTEMS 75, 75 (. Schmidhauser ed. 1987). Accord H. FERTIG, THE
THIRD REICH 600-27 (1975); E. KOLB, THE WEIMAR REPUBI C 36, 45 (P. Falla transl. 1988); A.
NICHOLLS, WEIMAR AND THE RISE OF HITLER 46-48 (1968).
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defendants, only one (Torgler) was able to find an attorney who took the
case seriously.49
The French judiciary-virtually without change of personnel except
for routine retirements-faithfully enforced the law of the democratic
Third Republic until June 1940, the law of the fascist Vichy regime from
1940 until 1944, and the law of the democratic Fourth Republic thereaf-
ter.5 0 During the Vichy period, "[p]erhaps the most casuistic and excited
debate in the French courts" 5 1-pursued with meticulous precision-
involved the burden of proving Jewishness under statutes enacted by the
French to emulate the Nuremberg laws, with the result that, "[b]roadly
speaking, the antisemites got what they wanted."52
No Soviet lawyer is known to have attempted anything remotely like
what Pasternak did in his campaign to save Mandelstam, with its fright-
ening and "miraculous" telephone conversation with Stalin.5" Instead,
during the protracted period that began with the creation of the Cheka in
December 1917 and culminated in the purge trials and hysteria of the
1930s, the Soviet bar seemed more concerned with its own professional
prerogatives than with any obligation to defend civil liberties.54 It was
common in all the purge trials of the 1930s and 1950s for defense lawyers
to compete with the prosecutor in condemning their own clients, confin-
ing advocacy-if it appeared at all-to minute issues of sentence. 5  Some
defense lawyers, "anxious to illustrate their loyalty to the regime," asked
courts to impose "harsher penalties [on] their clients than [those]
requested by the prosecutor."5 6 Vyshinsky told them to stop on the
ground that the true function of a Soviet defense lawyer was to produce
just enough advocacy to create the impression of procedural justice--not
more and not less.5 7 (Those who produced more advocacy were profes-
sionally disciplined."5)
49. See TOBIAS, supra note 48, passim. Compare the conduct of the writer Carol von Ossietsky,
who was convicted of "literary treason" after he wrote a series of articles which exposed the Nazis
and the interest groups that were collaborating with them - as a result of which he was awarded the
1935 Nobel Peace Prize while incarcerated in a prison camp. See FERTIG, supra note 47, 608 (1975);
THE STOLEN REPUBLIC: SELECTED WRITINGS OF CARL VON OSSIETSKY (B. Frei ed. 1971).
50. R. PAXTON, VICHY FRANCE 339-40 (1972).
51. Weisberg, Avoiding Central Realitiev Narrative Terror and the Failure of French Culture
under the Occupation, 5 HUMAN. RTS. Q. 151, 163 (1983).
52. M. MARRUS & R. PAXTON, VICHY FRANCE AND THE JEWS 144 (1981). Compare Zola,
J'Accuse, L'AURORE, Jan. 13, 1898, with the judicial record reproduced in L. SNYDER, THE
DREYFUS CASE: A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY (1973).
53. See Mandelstam, supra note 25, at 145-47. For the context in which this occurred, see R.
CONQUEST, THE GREAT TERROR (3d ed. 1990), and R. MEDVEDEV, LET HISTORY JUDGE (2d ed.
1989).
54. See E. HUSKEY, RUSSIAN LAWYERS AND THE SOVIET STATE (1986).
55. See, e.g., M. COTiC, THE PRAGUE TRIAL 127-30 (1987); K. KAPLAN, REPORT ON THE
MURDER OF THE GENERAL SECRETARY 231 (1990).
56. HUSKEY, supra note 54, at 212.
57. Id. at 212.
58. Id. at 212-13. Eventually, to preclude such problems, these evolved into "show" trials in
which all the participants-lawyers, judges, witnesses, even the defendants themselves-learned
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Although there is a long and surviving tradition of human rights advo-
cacy in the South African bar59 (at times involving some of the leading
advocates in the country), the South African legal profession as a whole
has historically taken a "neutral attitude" toward apartheid.' And
although a small but growing part of the South African bar appears will-
ing to challenge apartheid61 and a similar part of the bench appears will-
ing to sustain such challenges,62 South African lawyers for the most part
have supported the status quo.63
"In the nineteen fifties and nineteen sixties.., very little protest was
heard from either the practising or legal academic profession....
Scholastic writing ... on the race laws [was limited] to formalistic
[and] technical [explanations] designed more to clarify the statute
than to evaluate its social, economic and political effects."
6
Moreover, the increased activism in recent years among South African
lawyers and judges may be part of a larger ambivalence that white South
African society as a whole has begun to feel about apartheid, an ambiva-
lence which has led the South African regime itself to start dismantling
some of the structures of repression.65
their parts by heart from pre-written scripts which had been approved in "the highest places."
Deviation from a script was brutally punished. See KAPLAN, supra note 55, at 196-236.
59. In a forthcoming book, Stephen Ellmann will explore the role of the South African legal
system and legal profession in restraining government power during the state of emergency in the
1980's.
60. Fernandez, supra note 45, at 136. See also Dugard, The Judiciary in a State of National
Crisis--With Special Reference to the South African Experience, 44 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 477, 486
(1987) (judicial indifference to torture by the security police as well as other abuses).
61. J. DUGARD, HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE SOUTH AFRICAN LEGAL ORDER 243-44 (1978) (a
"high standard of legal assistance [has been] rendered in political trials," id. at 247); J. JACKSON,
JUSTICE IN SOUTH AFRICA (1980); Cooper, Public Interest Law-South African Style, 11 COLUM.
HUM. RTs. L. REV. 105 (1979-80); Christenson & Deffenbaugh, The SWAPO trial- a Partisan Trial
in CHRISTENSON, POLITICAL TRIALS 35 (1986); Fernandez, supra note 45, at 136; White, To Learn
and Teach: Lessons from Driefontein on Lawyering and Power, 1988 Wis. L. REV. 699.
62. DUGARD, HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 61, at 279-88; Dugard, The Judiciary, supra note 60,
at 486, 488, 492-94; C. FORSYTH, IN DANGER FOR THEIR TALENTS: A STUDY OF THE APPELLATE
DIVISION OF THE SUPREME COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA FROM 1950-80 (1985); Basson, Judicial
Activism in a State of Emergency: An Examination of Recent Decisions of the South African Courts, 3
S. AFR. J. HUMAN RTS. 28 (1987); Christenson & Deffenbaugh, supra note 61, at 66-69; Cowling,
Judges and the Protection of Human Rights in South Africa: Articulating the Inarticulate Premise, 3
S. AFR. J. HUMAN RTS. 177 (1987); Mureinik, Pursuing Principle: The Appellate Division and
Review under the State of Emergency, 5 S. AFR. J. HUMAN RTS. 60 (1989); Comment, What Role
Can South African Judges Play in Mitigating Apartheid? A Study of the Urban African Legal
Regime, 1987 Wis. L. REV. 325.
63. DUGARD, HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 61, at 288-365; FORSYTH, supra note 62; Cameron,
Nude Monarchy: The Case of South Africa's Judges, 3 S. AFR. J. HUMAN RTS. 338 (1987); Haysom
& Plasket, The War Against Law: Judicial Activism and the Appellate Division, 4 S. AFR. J. HUMAN
RTs. 303 (1988); Marcus, Respect for the Courts: Myth and Reality, I S. AFR. J. HUMAN RTS. 236
(1985); Mathews, The South African Judiciary and the Security System, 1 S. AFR. J. HUMAN RTS.
199 (1985); Mureinik, supra note 62. The organized bar has failed to protest harassment of activist
lawyers by the government and has at times harassed them itself. DUGARD, supra note 61, at 244;
JACKSON, supra note 61, at 208-17.
64. Fernandez, supra note 45, at 135.
65. In some ways, the South African legal profession lags behind the regime. As late as
February 1991-long after the government had begun a gradual breakdown of apartheid-two white
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Formalism and legal positivism are the usual adaptive responses of
lawyers and law teachers who live under dictatorial regimes.6 6  In
Czechoslovia, not only were lawyers and law teachers part of the
machinery of oppression, but lay people described the regime's legal sys-
tem in exactly the same rhetoric used by the Critical Legal Studies move-
ment to describe American law. Havel, for example, wrote the following
in 1978:
[T]he legal code functions as an excuse. It wraps the base exercise
of power in the noble apparel of the letter of the law; it creates the
pleasing illusion that justice is done, society protected and the exer-
cise of power objectively regulated. All this is done to conceal...
the total manipulation of society. If an outside observer who knew
nothing at all about life in Czechoslovakia were to study only its
laws, ... [the] political manipulation of the courts... would remain
hidden .... [T]he legal code... is not more than a faqade, an aspect
of the world of appearances . . . [and] an essential instrument of
ritual communication .... It is the legal code that enables all com-
ponents of the system.., to put themselves in a good light, to estab-
lish ... legitimacy.67
As a general proposition, significant numbers of lawyers are willing to
fight to increase rights and liberties only in societies that are already free
in a number of fundamental ways and are likely to remain so. And even
in those societies, it is only a minority of lawyers-usually outsiders to
the established legal culture-who will take on such struggles. A lawyer
who specializes in fighting for civil rights or civil liberties has chosen a
deviant professional path-sometimes honored for its integrity and
charm, but deviant nonetheless-and a "normal" lawyer who takes on an
isolated civil rights or liberties case is considered to have committed an
act of deviance understandable only as a beau geste. Sometimes, the
established bar is quite hostile to these efforts.6" When lawyers in notice-
able numbers become involved in struggles to promote freedom, that
alone can usually be taken as evidence that a society already has enough
civic health to risk improving itself through its existing governmental
structures-a process in which lawyers are the mere instruments of ener-
gies far larger than themselves. But when a society's entire system of
liberty is attacked or has already been overcome (or aborted) by powerful
men could be fined as little as $200 and $80, respectively, after killing a black man by boiling him
alive in an industrial steam cleaning machine. N.Y. Times, Feb. 18, 1991, at 2, col. 3. Similar
sentences in other cases were imposed in the preceding two or three years. Id.
66. See Richards, supra note 45; Dugard, The Judiciary, supra note 60, at 496-98.
67. HAVEL, THE POWER OF THE POWERLESS, supra note 8, at 23, 73-75.
68. See, e.g., J. AUERBACH, UNEQUAL JUSTICE 232-59 (1976) (participation of the established
bar in civil liberties violations during the hysteria of the McCarthy era); J. BASS, UNLIKELY HEROES
289-96 (1981) (southern bar's refusal to represent civil rights plaintiffs in the 1960's and its eagerness
to ostracize lawyers who did).
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forces, lawyers almost never do more than other groups to promote
democracy-and very often they do substantially less.
This is a twentieth century phenomenon of the developed countries,69
for lawyers "were prominent.., in the bourgeois revolutions of the sev-
enteenth and eighteenth centuries, ' ' 70 principally the French and our
own.7 Edmund Burke is often quoted as blaming some portion of the
French Revolution on the "habitually meddling, daring, subtle, active
.. litigious dispositions and unquiet minds" of lawyers. 72 But that is a
quote out of context, both textually and historically, the latter more sig-
nificant than the former.
Burke made it clear that he was speaking not of all lawyers, but only of
mediocre ones-the "mechanical part" of the profession 71and that he
was complaining in particular of a group of lawyers who formed "a very
great proportion" of the the third estate in the States-General, which
was composed, not of distinguished magistrates, . . . not of leading
advocates, . . . not of renowned professors in universities,-but for
the far greater part .. . of the inferior, unlearned, mechanical,
merely instrumental members of the profession. . . . From the
moment I read the list, I saw distinctly, and very nearly as it has
happened, all that was to follow.74
Burke supposed that this group of lawyers persuaded their co-legislators
to unravel the institutions of organized society because to do so "would
lay open to them those innumerable lucrative jobs which follow in the
train of all great convulsions ... and particularly in all great and violent
permutations of property," 7'-as though the French Revolution began in
part as a kind of Avocats' and Notaires' Relief Act of 1789. So extrava-
gant a theory may have resulted from the application of imagination and
excitement to more basic and verifiable facts.
To the extent that the French bar as a whole resisted the monarchy
69. In the last two decades, some lawyers and judges in some underdeveloped countries have
formed an important part of the intelligentsia (in the classical sense of the word), often at great
personal risk. In Argentina in the 1970's and in Guatemala in the 1980's, for example, a number of
lawyers who represented dissidents were murdered by powerful political forces. Klitzman,
International Protection of the Independence of the Judicial Proces" Defending Lawyers Judges, and
the Rule of Law, 31 FED. BAR NEWS & J. 219, 219-220 (1984). See also F. ZIADEH, LAWYERS, THE
RULE OF LAW, AND LIBERALISM IN MODERN EGYPT (1968); In Defense of Right" Attacks on
Lawyers and Judges in 1989, LAWYERS COMM. FOR HUM. RTs. (1990); N.Y. Times, Mar. 10, 1991,
§ 4, at 2, col. 4 (Kenya).
70. Perdomo, The Venezualian Legal Profession: Lawyers in an Inegalitarian Society in 2
LAWYERS IN SOCIETY, supra note 45, at 380, 394.
71. Although Jefferson, John Adams, Patrick Henry, and a number of other revolutionists were
lawyers, the colonial bar was more divided than one might assume. The revolution "precipitated the
departure of many lawyers with Tory sympathies, including some of the most prominent
practitioners." R. ABEL, AMERICAN LAWYERS 40 (1989).
72. Burke, Reflections on the Revolution in France in 3 E. BURKE, WORKS 231, 287 (1899) (orig.
ed. 1790).
73. Id. at 287.
74. Id. at 286.
75. Id. at 287.
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while the latter was in power, it was only for the purpose of securing and
defending the professional privileges that were subsequently abolished in
1789.76 This was part of the jostling for spoils that interest groups
engage in in any society, and there was no hint of a design to bring down
the regime. When the revolution did come, it "persuaded large numbers
of advocates to abandon their professional loyalties and obligations in the
service of higher ideals" and to advocate the abolition of their own pre-
rogatives.77 This did not last long, however, and the French bar
expended enormous effort over the following several decades trying to
regain the privileges lost in the revolution.78
Tocqueville wrote that "[i]n England, [lawyers] have contracted a
close alliance with the aristocracy; [but] in France they have shown
themselves its most dangerous enemies."' 79 The cause in both cases may
have been the same: a robust guild, aspiring to privilege and everywhere
"very hostile to the revolutionary spirit,"'80 may have been co-opted in
one country and ignored, at the aristocracy's peril, in the other.8 1 Toc-
queville thought that in America lawyers had found a void and filled it
by becoming an aristocracy. 2 Once the era of bourgeois revolutions was
over, the bar's task in every developed country became to protect what it
had obtained, even at the cost of accomodating itself to new regimes of
more complete power than previously feasible.
Why are lawyers so much less effective than some writers8 a in such
76. Burrage, Revolution as a Starting Point for the Comparative Analyses of the French,
American, and English Legal Professions in 3 LAWYERS IN SOCIETY: COMPARATIVE THEORIES
322, 327-29 (R. Abel & P. Lewis ed. 1989). "Status seems to have been the major collective
preoccupation of advocates under the ancien rigime, subordinating all other goals." Id. at 328. "A
privileged body can never satisfy the ambitions of all its members .... so that a considerable number
of individuals are usually to be met with who are inclined to attack [whatever] privileges they cannot
soon enough turn to their own account." I A. TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 274 (P.
Bradley ed. 1966).
77. Burrage, supra note 76, at 329. "It is true that lawyers mainly contributed to the overthrow
of the French monarchy in 1789; but it remains to be seen whether they acted thus because they had
studied the laws or because they were prohibited from making them." TOCQUEVILLE, supra note 76,
at 274.
78. Id. at 330-31. Soon after Waterloo, the Paris bar "petitioned Louis XVIIIth for restoration
of their ancient rights, arguing that there was a natural affinity between the monarchy and
professional [i.e., the bar's] self-government." Id. at 331. When the monarchy did not see things
that way, the old struggle began all over again, and the bar "took a leading part in the movement to
overthrow the regime," which succeeded in 1830. Id. Resistance among the bar to successive
monarchical and imperial regimes continued, Id. at 331-32-apparently from mixed motives of
idealism and the defense of status-until the politics of the early years of the Third Republic, in the
last quarter of the nineteenth century, were dominated by lawyers after what was seen to be a
"tradition of opposition to authoritarianism." Boigeol, The French Bar: The Difficulties of Unifying
a Divided Profession in LAWYERS IN SOCIETY, VOL. 2, supra note 45, at 258, 269. In the twentieth
century, lawyers became much less prominent in French politics. Id.
79. TOCQUEVILLE, supra note 76, at 273.
80. Id.
81. "When an aristocracy excludes the leaders of [the legal] profession from its ranks, it excites
enemies.... But whenever an aristocracy consents to impart some of its privileges to these same
individuals, the two classes coalesce .. " Id. at 274-75.
82. Id. at 272-80.
83. The Soviet Writers' Union and its post-normalization Czechoslovak counterpart-and the
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extreme situations? Perhaps most importantly, a lawyer is vulnerable
because a life's work in the law is structured and thought of as a career
which needs to be nurtured and protected-so much so that when
threatened by dictatorship, a lawyer's first concern becomes how to sus-
tain that career by whatever means necessary. But a writer is a mere
conduit through which a voice speaks, and nothing is more important to
a writer than letting that voice describe whatever is worth commenting
on-even if the consequences might profoundly damage people the
writer loves." In situations where a lawyer is simply too intimidated to
act, a writer might not be able to stop himself or herself from speaking as
the conscience of a people.
Although books achieve extraordinarily wide readerships in Czecho-
slovakia-and did so even when good writing had to be distributed in
samizdat-"before being accepted, [a] book has to convey truth and hon-
esty because the sophisticated Czech reader will not tolerate pretense....
[Although] in our society writers can earn a decent living with their writ-
ing,... what is more important is moralprestige even if it is rewarded by
a prison term.",8 5 According to the Czech novelist Ivan Klima, the expe-
rience of oppression frees a writer from the corrupting interest in produc-
ing books that will sell, providing instead clarity of vision, intellectual
integrity, a bond of solidarity with those similarly afflicted, and complete
concentration on the most meaningful of themes.8 6 "Dissidence is said to
be an oddly liberating experience. Czech dissidents claim that, once
taken, the decision to stop dissembling, to risk everything, to be exactly
who and what they were, made life simple for them." 7
A lawyer, on the other hand, instinctively learns to work within a sys-
tem, even a corrupt or tyrannical one. A lawyer is a manipulator of
whatever structure of power he or she happens to be confronted with. To
make a life's work out of manipulating a structure of power is to come to
literary establishments of other countries, too, both east and west-have included ample numbers of
opportunists capable of behaving unspeakably in order to promote their own interests. See, e.g.,
HAVEL, DISTURBING THE PEACE, supra note 7, at 92 (some Czechoslovak writers "produc[ed]
articles that .. .helped create a climate for mass approval" of the purge trials of the 1950's); V.
VOINOVICH, THE IVANKIAD (1976) (lavish living conditions of favored writers in the Soviet writers'
union).
84. As he got older, William Faulkner found that he had to be drunk to write at his best. He
went through cycles of bored sobriety and inspired intoxication. His daughter Jill feared the latter,
and she could recognize signs of each approaching binge. Once-when she was about 12 years old
and had missed her father deeply because he had lived part of the preceding years elsewhere to write
film scripts--she realized that he was about to go on a roaring drunk that might last for weeks, and
she begged him not to. He brushed her aside with words she never forgot: "Nobody remembers
Shakespeare's children." 2 J. BLOTNER, FAULKNER 1204 (1974).
85. K. Pecka, Literature is Not a Matter of Course, paper delivered at the NYU Conf. on Czech
Lit. & Culture, Mar. 21, 1990, at 2 (emphasis added).
86. Klima, The Unexpected Merits of Oppression, paper delivered at the NYU Conf. on Czech
Lit. & Culture, Mar. 17, 1990. "The more I was deprived of things which I used to enjoy-e.g.
editorial meetings, lectures, applause, prizes, and public recognition-the freer I felt." Klima,
quoted in H. SKILLING, SAMIZDAT, supra note 29, at 76-77.
87. Kramer, Letter from Europe, The New Yorker, Mar. 12, 1990, at 74.
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terms with it, to avoid issues that cannot be fit into its routine methods of
decision-making, to devalue or reject clients whose causes would inhibit
the lawyer's access to it, and ultimately to become a part of it.
And as a life's work, writing may simply be more attractive than lawy-
ering to people whose personalities are so "unreasonable" as to make
them well suited to undermining a regime. John Gardner listed the fol-
lowing among qualities commonly found among novelists:
"obstinacy and a tendency toward churlishness (a refusal to believe
what all sensible people know is true); ... an apparent lack of...
serious life purpose [in other words, insufficient ambition];... a lack
of proper respect; mischievousness ... ; a strange mixture of shame-
less playfulness and embarrassing earnestness ...; patience like a
cat's; a criminal streak of cunning; .. .and improvidence."88
In contrast, psychologists, psychotherapists, and others have found
among lawyers heightened needs for certainty and orderliness,89 for
financial security, 9" and for the esteem of others9 '-none of which form a
good foundation for a high-risk resistance to dictatorship. In any eco-
nomic system-even one that calls itself socialist-lawyers as a group
form a kind of gentry, with the concerns about respectability and appear-
ances that reached their apotheosis in the Victorian middle class.92 The
passions that inform (and inflame) an intelligentsia, on the other hand,
are more artistic or philosophical than professional.
V. NONVIOLENT RESISTANCE TO TOTALITARIAN REGIMES
Nearly all of the American debate about civil disobedience has been
centered around the question of whether, in a relatively free society, it is
88. J. GARDNER, ON BECOMING A NOVELIST 34 (1983).
89. Watson, The Quest for Professional Competence: Psychological Aspects of Legal Education,
37 U. CIN. L. REV. 91, 101 (1968). See also TOCQUEVILLE, supra note 76, at 273 ("certain habits of
order, a taste for formalities"). Law seems to attract bureaucratic, rule-enforcement oriented
temperaments. See Sternberg, Prototypes of Competence and Incompetence in COMPETENCE
CONSIDERED 117, 140 (R. Sternberg & J. Kolligan ed. 1990).
90. Condlin, The Moral Failure of Clinical Legal Education in THE GOOD LAWYER:
LAWYERS' ROLES AND LAWYERS' ETHICS 317, 330 (D. Luban ed. 1984); Leete, Francia &
Strawser, A Look at Lawyers' Need Satisfaction, 57 A.B.A.J. 1193 (1971).
91. Condlin, supra note 90, at 330; Reich, California Psychological Inventory: Profile of a
Sample of First- Year Law Students, 39 PSYCHOLOGICAL REP. 871 (1976).
92. Gandhi practiced law for twenty years. A 1913 photograph-taken near the end of this
period-shows him seated outside his Johannesburg law office in a well-tailored three-piece suit,
with the smile of a confident and prosperous professional and surrounded by a handful of employees
in equally formal but less dashing clothing.. The words "M.K. Gandhi, Attorney" are boldly painted
on a window. In another photograph, taken eighteen years later at the London conference convened
by the British government in a purported attempt to resolve the Indian crisis, the prime minister and
a sizeable crowd of cabinet and lesser officials of the British Empire are seated with a few
representatives from India in an ornate room in St. James's Palace. Every figure but one is staring
intently at the camera in a show of purposefulness. Gandhi is looking downward, perhaps lost in
thought; his face seems to show puzzlement or contemplation or both. But he stands out in this
scene for a more obvious reason: he is the only person wearing nothing but a sheet. (The
photographs appear at R. PAYNE, THE LIFE AND DEATH OF GANDHI 192 ff. (1969).) See also M.
GANDHI, THE STORY OF MY EXPERIMENTS WITH TRUTH 167-68 (1954).
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morally defensible to provoke change through obstructive resistance
(albeit nonviolent), rather than through electioneering and lobbying.
This question was examined with particular thoroughness throughout
the period of student demonstrations against the Vietnam War and the
preceding period of civil rights demonstrations.93 Along the way, it has
always been assumed that civil disobedience has an effect only on an
adversary who has significant inhibitions based on democratic tradi-
tions-in the American South, for example, or in India under the British
Raj94-and that nonviolent resistance is entirely useless against a totali-
tarian regime. Even before 1989, there was some evidence that at least in
certain circumstances that assumption is wrong. 95 Although perhaps
only tentative suggestions can now be made about what those circum-
stances might be, 96 nonviolent resistance, aside from its moral value, may
be much more powerful as a strategy than generally believed, even
against dictatorships.
The decisive idea of the Czechoslovak uprising was expressed in the
parable of the greengrocer in Vaclav Havel's essay The Power of the Pow-
erless,97 which the samizdat network distributed throughout the country
while he was incarcerated for his work with Charter 77. Havel's hypo-
thetical greengrocer receives from the state a poster reading "Workers of
the World, Unite!" which he automatically places in the shop window
"because everyone does it .... because that is the way it has to be,"
93. See, e.g., A. BICKEL, THE MORALITY OF CONSENT 91-123 (1975); CIVIL DISOBEDIENCE:
THEORY AND PRACTICE (H. Bedau ed. 1969); REVOLUTION AND THE RULE OF LAW (E. Kent ed.
1971); Arendt, Civil Disobedience in Is LAW DEAD? 212 (E. Rostow ed. 1971).
94. Because of the kind of memory distortion that causes the more unrealistic forms of nostalgia,
we may overestimate the amount of civilized behavior inherent in both these examples. In India, the
British "were far more brutal in repression than is today remembered. People not only suffered in
foul prisons and prison camps, but literally had their skulls cracked in beatings with steel-shod
bamboo rods... and were shot while demonstrating"-as at Amritsar, where the British army killed
379 people by opening fire, without warning, on "unarmed Indians holding a peaceful meeting."
SHARP, supra note 43, at 12 (1979). To the extent the British acted with restraint in India, that
"may be related more to the peculiar problems posed by a nonviolent resistance movement and to
the kind of forces [thus] set in motion, than to the opponent being 'British.' The same people
showed little restraint in dealing with the Mau Mau in Kenya .. " Id.
And during the long period when blacks in the American South could be beaten or lynched with
impunity, they might not have noticed that their lives were seriously affected by any inhibitions
based on democratic traditions. Those who worked with the Southern Christian Leadership
Conference and allied groups such as the Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee always knew
their lives were constantly in danger. See A. FAIRCLOUGH, To REDEEM THE SOUL OF AMERICA:
THE SOUTHERN CHRISTIAN LEADERSHIP CONFERENCE AND MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR. 101
(1987); D. GARROW, BEARING THE CROSS: MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR AND THE SOUTHERN
CHRISTIAN LEADERSHIP CONFERENCE 173-268, 357-430 (1986). Chaney, Goodman, and
Schwerner were murdered; Medgar Evers was murdered; Viola Liuzzo was murdered; people whose
names never reached national attention were murdered; countless demonstrators and potential
demonstrators were shot at and beaten by whites, individually, in small groups, and in mobs; and
finally Martin Luther King, Jr. was murdered. See FAIRCLOUGH, passim; GARROW, passim; M.
VIORST, FIRE IN THE STREETS 222, 258-59 (1979).
95. See infra text accompanying notes 121-37.
96. See infra text accompanying notes 145-48.
97. HAVEL, THE POWER OF THE POWERLESS, supra note 8, at 23.
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because "[i]f he were to refuse, there could be trouble."9 There would in
fact have been a lot of trouble. The regime would not have been able to
tolerate a refusal that would have revealed that those who complied were
"living a lie," and-if it were to have gone unpunished-would have
revealed further that "it is possible to live within the truth."99 It was not
just the hapless greengrocer whose obedience would have helped others
to be obedient. It was also the obedience of all who served on the nor-
malization committees and their successors, performing-with professed
regret-the distasteful duty of identifying ideologically unreliable citi-
zens; and the obedience of the supervisors who dutifully fired those so
identified; and the obedience of the lawyers who prosecuted them and of
the judges who sentenced them; and so on.
The parable of the greengrocer grew out of the long, frustrating, and
seemingly quixotic efforts of Charter 77, a very small group which,
beginning on January 1, 1977, did nothing other than issue hundreds of
documents, each demanding that the regime in one way or another tell
the truth or live up to its own statutes and treaties.m°° Without any of the
mass activity of Solidarity in Poland and "abstaining even from demon-
strations, [Charter 77] confined itself to the written word. Its documents
were, the Chartists believed, carefully studied by the authorities," who
felt compelled to react to them in the media and in actions both negative
and positive."0' In that way, the Chartists began to some extent to set
the agenda for public discourse, asking people to "call things by their real
names," 02 -and provoking the regime to require the entire population
to sign an "anti-Charter." "They confined themselves to extremely sim-
ple moral acts [such as] telling the truth[:] truth in itself is not a moral
value, but to tell it in all circumstances is one of the highest.... 103
Havei argued that the greengrocer's obedience was itself an oppression
of anyone else who knew of it. As long as one obeys, others feel com-
pelled to obey, and when many obey, all feel compelled to obey. The
result is that "everyone in his or her own way is both a victim and a
supporter of the system."'" But the contrary can also happen: if some
98. Id., at 27.
99. Id. at 40 (emphasis in original).
100. SKILLING, SAMIZDAT, supra note 29, at 47. See also HAVEL, THE POWER OF THE
POWERLESS, supra note 8, passim.
101. SKILLING, SAMIZDAT, supra note 29, at 69-71.
102. Kusy, Chartism and "Real Socialism" in HAVEL, THE POWER OF THE POWERLESS, supra
note 8, at 152, 169.
103. Todorov, Post-Totalitarian Depression, New Republic, June 25, 1990, at 23, 24.
104. HAVEL, THE POWER OF THE POWERLESS, supra note 8, at 37. During the years of
seemingly quixotic opposition, Charter 77 was neither accepted by the public nor rejected by it. The
public was somewhat sympathetic but troubled by the Charter's challenge to the accommodations
people had made and the self-delusions with which they reassured themselves. But eventually, the
Carter became "a kind of gauge of honesty and courage against which people judged their own and
others' behavior ... , nudging people to act more independently and decently." SKILLING,
SAMIZDAT, supra note 29, at 70. Like Rosa Parks' refusal to give up a seat on a segregated bus in
Montgomery, Alabama in 1955, it fit into the category of the seemingly quixotic gesture which
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disobey, others will realize that "it is possible to live within the truth,"10 5
and if many disobey-so many that they cannot all be punished-all can
do so, virtually with impunity. "The power of the powerless greengrocer
was to stop obeying and thereby to stop encouraging the obedience of
others .... [This] was the decisive idea-the one that persuaded the pub-
lic to rise up in the manner it did and that caused the regime to unravel
in the way that it did."16 The theory of the greengrocer did not create
the uprising, which-typically-arose out of a revolutionary situation
begun elsewhere and not of the revolutionists' making."0 7 Instead, it
determined the uprising's course and character and its ending, which
came when the regime failed to prevent a general strike of a mere two
hours' duration. The regime knew it was beaten because it had accepted
Havel's analysis that if a sufficient portion of the public were to gain the
emotional strength to decide when to obey and when not to do so, it was
the regime itself that would become powerless. And once that was
demonstrated, the regime simply gave up and resigned.'08
Part of the difficulty in discussing civil disobedience or nonviolent
resistance is that our conception of it does not extend much beyond
vague images of people going limp in the arms of arresting police officers.
Gandhi was quite impatient with the idea of passive resistance, which he
considered a distortion of his technique, caused by the narrow cultural
experience of Westerners and perhaps by confusion with the Quaker con-
cept of bearing witness. "I [do] not believe in passive resistance," he
said. "Satyagraha is something very active. It is the reverse of passive.
Submission is passive and I dislike submission."" Our foggy historical
memory of Gandhi is that of a mystic whose holiness affected politics in a
strange oriental way difficult for Westerners to understand. But Gandhi
was an insurrectionist plain and simple, and in his view nonviolent resist-
ance was a technique of insurrection. "I was a believer in the politics of
petitions, deputations, and friendly negotiations," he said during the
march to the sea in 1930 to make salt. "But [in practice] all these have
gone to the dogs. I know that these are not the ways to bring this Gov-
appears futile-even self-destructive-when it occurs, but afterward can be seen to have galvanized
resistance or otherwise changed the character of the conflict.
105. Id. at 40 (emphasis in original).
106. Neumann, On Strategy, 59 FORDHAM L. REV. 299, 343 n.124 (1990).
107. "Revolutionary situations are rarely the creation of revolutionists, who start in weakness;
instead, the true skill of revolution is the recognition and exploitation of revolutionary situations
created by others or by circumstances that are out of anyone's control." Id. at 303 n. 15.
108. Gandhi wrote that "it is not so much British guns that are responsible for our subjection as
our voluntary co-operation." Quoted in SHARP, supra note 43, at 47. "To blame [the British] for
this is to perpetuate their power." Id. at 46-47. "[N]o Government can exist .. .without the co-
operation of the people, willing or forced, and if people suddenly withdraw their cooperation in
every detail, the Government will come to a stand-still." M. GANDHI, NON-VIOLENT RESISTANCE
(SATYAGRAHA) 157 (1951).
109. L. FISCHER, GANDHI AND STALIN 50 (1947). See also Gandhi, THE ORIGINS OF
SATYAGRAHA DOCTRINE IN THE QUIET BATTLE: WRITINGS ON THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF
NON-VIOLENT RESISTANCE 30, 37-39 (1963).
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ernment round. Sedition has become my religion.' ' l l
Nonviolent resistance tries to convert the adversary's greatest
strength-his willingness and capacity to inflict brutality-into weak-
ness. 1 " If both sides are violent, each gains justification and moral reas-
surance from the other's violence,112 and each side's violence confirms
some or all of the other's propaganda directed at third parties. 1 3 But if
one side refuses to fight and instead offers to suffer, the adversary, out of
bewilderment, begins to lose confidence that he is justified-begins, in
other words, to lose a vicious combative energy-and each further act of
violence exposes him to third parties as brutal." 4 In the American civil
rights movement, this was referred to as "'moral jujitsu,' a way of rat-
tling the opponent and encouraging him to commit discreditable
deeds."' 1"
One of the worst defeats of the American civil rights movement was in
Albany, Georgia, where the adversary was not confused and instead
designed its tactics to match nonviolent resistance with unyielding but
nonviolent-and therefore seemingly reasonable-assertions of power.
The result was to turn the strategy of bewilderment around and use it
aggressively against nonviolent demonstrators themselves. Unlike
"Bull" Connor, the Commissioner of Public Safety in Birmingham, who
ordered police to assault demonstrators-many of them children-with
clubs, dogs, and high-pressure fire hoses, and unlike Sheriff James Clark
in Selma, whose "Bloody Sunday" police charge on peaceful demonstra-
tors on the Edmund Pettus Bridge stunned the nation, Laurie Pritchett-
the police chief of Albany-trained his officers in the art of arresting
110. Quoted in SHARP, supra note 43, at 50 (emphasis added). The mysticism surrounding
Gandhi's idea of nonviolent resistance, or satyagraha, obscures his own thoughts about its use as
strategy. He generally presented satyagraha as though it were inseparable from his ascetic
philosophy as a whole, which is based, among other things, on the premise that "the world of solid
objects is an illusion to be escaped from." Orwell, Reflections on Gandhi in COLLECTED ESSAYS,
JOURNALISM AND LETTERS OF GEORGE ORWELL, VOL. IV: IN FRONT OF YOUR NOSE, 1945-1950,
at 466 (S. Orwell & I. Angus ed. 1968). But he also plainly thought of it as strategy, using military
metaphors in setting out its precepts. He called satyagrahi "a nonviolent army," GANDHI, NON-
VIOLENT RESISTANCE, supra note 108, at 86, 98, 100, who must "behave like disciplined soldiers,"
Id. at 56. We will probably never know whether this was simply an instance of an idea fulfilling two
functions, whether it was a form of rationalization and self-justification novel to us only because we
are outside its cultural references, or whether it was a cynical packaging of strategy as spirituality.
"Saints should always be judged guilty until they are proved innocent," Orwell wrote of Gandhi, and
"inside th[is] saint, or near-saint, there was a very shrewd, able person." Orwell, supra, at 463. Civil
disobedience may have been Gandhi's way of refusing to debase himself upon entering politics,
"which of their nature are inseparable from coercion and fraud." Id. Civil disobedience is, after all,
truthful persuasion, and the word satyagraha itself means the force of truth or "insistence on truth."
GANDHI, NON-VIOLENT RESISTANCE, supra note 108, at 3, 78.
111. See FAIRCLOUGH, supra note 94, at 7.
112. R. GREGG, THE PSYCHOLOGY AND STRATEGY OF GANDHI'S NONVIOLENT RESISTANCE 5
(1929).
113. Id.
114. Id. at 18-20.
115. FAIRCLOUGH, supra note 94, at 237. The Southern Christian Leadership Conference often
tried to provoke "dramatic violence" which would morally discredit its adversaries. Id. at 229.
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demonstrators with disarming courtesy and gentleness. "I researched
Dr. King. I read about his early days in Montgomery, his methods
there.... For a period of four to five months [before demonstrations
began in Albany] members of the Albany Police Department ... were
lectured and shown films [at each roll call] on how to conduct them-
selves. .. .""6 Pritchett's unyielding but relentlessly polite arresting
machine so exhausted and demoralized the Southern Christian Leader-
ship Conference and the Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee
that their uneasy collaboration fell into bickering and mutual
recrimination. "17
The strategic power of civil disobedience-its capacity both to wound
and to seduce the adversary-comes from the opposite of belligerence: a
need to build or repair relationships; to find what Carol Gilligan calls
"the inclusive solution""' 8 (one which satisfies the needs of all who are
involved); and to break through to and "connect" with the adversary,
freeing the adversary from the role of oppressor as well as oneself from
the role of the oppressed. Gandhi considered satyagraha to be an exten-
sion into politics of the principles of responsible family life, in which dis-
obedience, when it occurs, is mixed with regret and longing for ways to
repair damage to relationships based on affection and respect." 9
Although it may be, as Orwell wrote, "difficult to see how Gandhi's
methods could be applied in a country where opponents of the regime
disappear in the middle of the night and are never heard of again,"' 2 let
us take an extreme example: Nazis intent on committing the mass mur-
der of Jews in a country whose non-Jewish population refuses to permit it
and refuses at the same time to fight over the issue.
When the Nazis invaded Denmark in April 1940, they demanded that
the Danish government accept military occupation in an ultimatum
which ended with the following words: "the Government of the Reich
assures the Royal Danish Government that Germany has no intention
now or in the future of encroaching upon the Kingdom of Denmark's
territorial integrity or political independence."121 This was, of course, a
lie, although for reasons of expediency the Nazis-who were then fight-
ing in Norway and about to invade France-temporarily allowed the
116. Quoted in FAIRCLOUGH, supra note 94, at 101. See also id. at 85-109 (Albany), 111-39
(Birmingham), 225-51 (Selma), as well as GARROW, supra note 94, at 173-268, 357-430 (1986).
117. FAIRCLOUGH, supra note 94, at 20, 106-9.
118. Remarks by Gilligan in Feminist Discourse, Moral Values, and the Law-A Conversation,
34 BUFF. L. REV. 11, 45 (1985). See also C. GILLIGAN, IN A DIFFERENT VOICE 25-37 (1982).
Havel's "habit of forgiveness-the mother's riposte to the father's rule of law-is one of the signs of
his leadership." Malcolm, The WINDOW-WASHER, NEW YORKER, Nov. 1990, at 56, 102.
119. GANDHI, NON-VIOLENT RESISTANCE, supra note 108, at 19. When a revolutionary
movement succeeds through conspiracy and violence, the government it establishes is often marked
by the same characteristics. Open civil disobedience protects not only the morality of the
revolutionaries, but also the morality of their success.
120. Orwell, supra note 110, at 468-69
121. L. YAHIL, THE RESCUE OF DANISH JEWRY 32 (1969).
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Danish government to continue to function internally. But the Danes
seized on these words and insisted on compliance-through calm and
principled discourse remarkably like that prescribed by Fisher and
Ury122 -in what the Danes came to call "the policy of negotiation.'
23
Throughout that period, although the Danes had to make many conces-
sions, they refused to compromise on two points which they considered
essential: first, that the only police force operating in the country would
be the Danish one already in existence, which would enforce Danish law
and no other, and, second, that no Danish Jew would be harmed in any
way. 124
For more than three years, this created an atmosphere in which the
Nazis stationed in Denmark constantly had to justify themselves with
arguments which eventually they themselves began to disbelieve. The
result was that Berlin continually found that the German officials
assigned to Denmark "became unsure of themselves and were no longer
reliable.'" 25 And when those officials were replaced, their replacements
became unreliable as well. 126 Eventually, "even the men of the Gestapo
began sabotaging orders from Berlin"'127 because they felt a need "to
appear as decent people in Danish eyes."' 28 But when Copenhagen ship-
yard workers went out on strike in August 1943, Berlin could tolerate it
no longer and ordered that the country be placed under the equivalent of
martial law and that the long-delayed seizure of the Danish Jews for
deportation to the death camps be planned in secret for the night of
October 1.129
When Eichmann's operatives arrived in Copenhagen to work out the
122. R. FISHER & W. URY, GETTING TO YES (1981).
123. YAHIL, supra note 121, at 32-126, 147-54.
124. Id. at 42-52. In other occupied countries, local gentiles reacted to the Holocaust in any of
three ways. Some tried to save Jews individually or in small numbers, "double-dealing and double-
crossing" the Nazis but without publicly "contest[ing] the policy as such." ARENDT, EICHMANN,
supra note 48, at 171. ("[O]nly the Danes dared speak out on the subject to their German masters."
Id. at 171. See also YAHIL, supra note 121, at xix.) A second and perhaps the largest group did not
care or were afraid to care about what happened to their Jewish neighbors and therefore ignored the
entire question. But much of the time, local gentiles were themselves actively anti-Semitic and
collaborated-often eagerly-in rounding up Jews, stealing their possessions, and cheering as they
were removed from sight by the Nazis. In Poland, Hungary, and Romania, the Holocaust
supplanted local persecutions already in progress when the war began. E. MENDELSOHN, THE JEWS
OF EAST CENTRAL EUROPE BETWEEN THE WORLD WARS 68-81, 112-24, 202-10 (1983). The
Romanians grew so impatient for their Jews to be taken away that they decided to do it themselves,
typically packing thousands of people "into freight cars and letting them die there of suffocation
while the train traveled through the countryside without plan or aim for days on end," after which
"a favorite follow-up.., was to expose the corpses in Jewish butcher shops." ARENDT, EICHMANN,
supra note 48, at 191. In this and similar ways, the Romanians killed nearly 300,000 Jews "mostly
without any German help" until the Nazis "intervened... so that the killing could be done in what,
according to them, was a civilized way." Id. at 190, 192.
125. ARENDT, EICHMANN, supra note 48, at 187. See also id. at 172-73.
126. YAHIL, supra note 121, at 60-61, 67-83, 97-101, 115-16, 146-81, 266-68, 401-05.
127. ARENDT, EICHMANN, supra note 48, at 190. See also id. at 173, 175.
128. YAHIL, supra note 121, at 274.
129. See ARENDT, EICHMANN, supra note 48, at 172-73; YAHIL, supra note 121, at 122-30.
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details of the operation, they found themselves in a situation which was
unique. The Danes, who were occupied and defeated, were setting stan-
dards of behavior to which a number of German officials already on the
scene felt obliged to conform, rather than the other way around. And
some local German officials had been so subverted that they sabotaged
the operation in two ways. First, they contrived orders that no home was
to be broken into "because the Danish police might interfere," which, of
course, meant that the forces Eichmann's operatives had to import hast-
ily from Germany-because Germans already in Denmark were not
trustworthy-"could seize only those Jews who voluntarily opened their
doors."' 30 And second, the advantage of surprise was lost because local
German officials surreptitiously made sure that leading Danes knew what
was going to happen. The result was that on the night designated for the
seizure of all Danish Jews, the Nazis "found exactly 477 people, out of a
total of more than 7,800, at home and willing to let them in.'
3 1
What followed was a mass rescue-spontaneously organized by
Danes--of nearly all the Jews still being hunted by Nazis. This required
finding people who were in hiding, transporting them secretly to coastal
fishing villages, and taking them to Sweden at night in the holds of small
fishing boats-all of which consumed the month of October 1943.132
Virtually every significant organization in Denmark protested to the
Germans, some even before the operation began (on the basis of informa-
tion leaked by Germans themselves).' 33  "The Germans stood astounded
and to some degree helpless before this strange phenomenon.' 3 4 They
seemed unable to defend themselves when challenged on moral
grounds, 135 and Eichmann later recalled with bitterness that "[t]hat
small country caused us more difficulties than anything else."'
136
130. ARENDT, EiCHMANN, supra note 48, at 173. See also YAHIL, supra note 121, at 172.
131. ARENDT, EICHMANN, supra note 48, at 173.
132. See YAHIL, supra note 121, at 237-82; R. PETROW, THE BITTER YEARS: THE INVASION
AND OCCUPATION OF DENMARK AND NORWAY, APRIL 1940-MAY 1945, at 212-23 (1974). This
was "the greatest mass rescue operation of World War II." PETROW, supra, at 216.
133. YAHIL, supra note 121, at 230-31. The Danish church sent to the Germans a letter of
protest which was read from the pulpit in every church in the country at Sunday services a day and a
half after the operation began. Id. at 235. The letter concluded with the following statement: "[We
shall therefore struggle to insure the continued guarantee to our Jewish brothers and sisters of the
same freedom we ourselves treasure more than life itself. . . . We will therefore unambiguously
declare our allegiance to the doctrine that bids us obey God more than man." Id. at 236. "I would
rather die with the Jews than live with the Nazis," a typical pastor told his congregation. H.
FLENDER, RESCUE IN DENMARK, 69 (1963).134. YAHIL, supra note 121, at 278. Many Germans simply "acquies[ced] in the escape of the
Jews." PETROW, supra note 132, at 226. Troops frequently looked the other way, and naval patrol
boats were at times kept in port on the spurious excuse that they needed repairs. See id. and YAHIL,
supra note 121, at 267-68.
135. The histories of the rescue are replete with scenes like this: a student driving a car filled
with escaping refugees was stopped by a German patrol, and everyone was ordered out. "Be
human," the student told the German soldier who was giving orders. "We have children with us."
The German looked into the car and told the student to drive on. PETROW, supra note 132, at 227
(emphasis added).
136. PETROW, supra note 132, at 213-14. In every other occupied country (except Bulgaria), the
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Hannah Arendt observed that this was "the only case we know of in
which the Nazis met with open native resistance, and the result seems to
have been that those exposed to it changed their minds .... They had
met resistance based on principle, and their 'toughness' had melted like
butter in the sun. ... "'I This has been attempted so infrequently that
we can have only the vaguest and most tentative ideas of the circum-
stances in which civil disobedience might debilitate "an opponent pos-
sessing vastly superior means of violence."' 3 8 But certain prerequisites
seem apparent.
First (and obviously), a large proportion of the population must be
willing to risk arrest, physical injury, and perhaps death. If the regime
has been inaccurately evaluated, a peaceful demonstration can turn into a
bloodbath (as it did in Petersburg in 1905). Civil disobedience can
require even more physical courage than violent resistance would: it is,
after all, an offer to suffer, if necessary, the adversaries' brutality. And
successful nonviolent resistance is a mass activity. The numbers involved
have to be so large that the adversaries feel the sensation of sand being
swept away from under their feet.
Second, the resisters must act with calm, self-discipline, and cohesive-
ness (which, paradoxically, seem most effective when achieved spontane-
ously). If civil disobedience is "a way of defeating the enemy without
hurting him and without feeling or arousing hatred," 13 9 large numbers of
people have to be firm without showing either anger (which prevents the
adversaries from listening and incites their desire to fight) or fear (which
incites their desire to inflict cruelty).Y"
Third, throughout their actions and discourse, the resisters must both
enunciate and illustrate the principles of civic behavior to which they
demand that their adversaries conform. It is this demand for morality
that so shocks adversaries who otherwise think of raw power and submis-
sion. But it lacks credibility unless reflected in the resisters' own conduct
so convincingly that the adversaries come to fear the possibility of their
own moral inferiority.
Fourth, the resisters' actions must be designed to shatter their adversa-
ries' confidence and ultimately to demoralize them.1 4 Civic Forum used
proportion of Jews who perished was vastly greater than it was in Denmark. in some countries, it
was as high as 70 or 80 per cent. See ARENDT, EICHMANN, supra note 48, passim. The Danish
figure was less than two per cent. See YAHIL, supra note 121, at 318-19. This seemed so miraculous
at the time that embellishments and legends-such as the fable about the Danish king volunteering
to wear the yellow star-were invented almost immediately to explain it. See YAHIL, supra note
121, at xiii, 61-64; PETROW, supra note 132, at 227-29.
137. ARENDT, EICHMANN, supra note 48, at 175 (emphasis in original). There may have been
isolated communities elsewhere where similar behavior had the same result. See P. HALLIE, LEST
INNOCENT BLOOD BE SHED (1979) (the French village of Le Chambon).
138. ARENDT, EICHMANN, supra note 48, at 171.
139. Orwell, supra note 110, at 467.
140. GREGG, supra note 112, at 27.
141. For lack of this prerequisite, most of the strikes, demonstrations, and other forms of civil
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sound strategic judgment in shaping its general strike, accurately believ-
ing that the decisive event-the one that would mortally wound the
regime-would be a demonstrated proof that the workers were no longer
willing to acquiesce in the status quo. The strike was defined to do that
without hurting the economy or the workers' own incomes. (It was
timed to begin at noon and to last only two hours.) Civic Forum and the
students concentrated their efforts around this decisive event and did not
waste them elsewhere. They thus caused "a strategic dislocation," '142 so
great that the regime was checkmated with nearly all its pieces still on
the board-its army, its police, and all its weaponry complete and intact.
Fifth, the resisters would have to come from a mature civic culture
that values communality, shuns confrontation, and is devoid of swagger-
ing and bravado. To the extent that a culture trivializes ideas of connec-
tion and the protection and nurturing of relationships (in ways which we
are just beginning to understand through feminist literature), it is less
likely to be able to engage in civil disobedience. And a cultural prefer-
ence for problem-solving through humor and wit, rather than through
exercises of power, seems somehow valuable, perhaps because it defuses
the mutual defensiveness of confrontation.
Finally, as with all revolutions, the situation would have to be ripe,
usually as a result of factors beyond the insurrectionists' control. Per-
haps most important in this respect, the totalitarian regime would have
to have lost some of its paranoia. Gandhi "seems wherever possible to
have believed that other people ... had a better nature through which
they could be approached," '43 which "is not necessarily true ... when
you are dealing with lunatics,"'" and for that reason civil disobedience
would have been an impossible strategy in the Soviet Union during the
Great Terror of the 1930's and for a long time thereafter. But by 1989
most of the Soviet regimes in Europe had been in power so firmly and for
so long-after so much propaganda had been believed and so many hab-
its of obedience had been developed-that the employment of rough
measures had become more a matter of administrative routine than of
political hysteria.145 In Denmark, a similar evolution happened much
disobedience in occupied Europe during the Second World War gained little tangible strategic
advantage other than preserving the integrity and sometimes raising the morale of local people while
occasionally depriving the occupiers of the delusion that their presence might actually be wanted.
See J. HAESTRUP, EUROPEAN RESISTANCE MOVEMENTS, 1939-1945, at 76-146 (1981).
142. B. LIDDEL HART, STRATEGY 339-40 (2d Rev. Ed. 1967).
143. Orwell, supra note 110, at 464.
144. Id. at 469.
145. After in their early years crushing all significant opposition, the regimes in East Central
Europe developed a mentality which Havel called "post-totalitarian." HAVEL, THE POWER OF THE
POWERLESS, supra note 8, at 23, 24-27. "I do not wish to imply by the prefix 'post-' that the system
is no longer totalitarian; on the contrary, I mean that it is totalitarian in a way fundamentally
different from classical dictatorships, different from totalitarianism as we usually understand it." Id.
at 27. Before reaching this state, a regime is so fearful of overthrow that irrational amounts of
energy are expended terrorizing its subjects and intimidating outsiders. But after a long time with
[Vol. 3: 157
32
Yale Journal of Law & the Humanities, Vol. 3, Iss. 2 [1991], Art. 2
https://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/yjlh/vol3/iss2/2
Neumann
more quickly and for very different reasons. There, the occupiers had
been deluded into a sense of security by their quick victory in 1940,
before the period of negotiation put large numbers of them in firm con-
tact with moral reality-something that was impossible in the hysterical
atmosphere inside Germany itself and in other occupied countries where
the Nazis were exclusively concerned with shooting at saboteurs, rather
than trying to justify to the local inhabitants their every act.
The Dutch, for example, wanted to save Jews every bit as much as the
Danes did. "Holland had been the only country in all Europe where
students went on strike when Jewish professors were dismissed and
where a wave of strikes broke out in response to the first deportation of
Jews to German concentration camps.'' 46 But three-quarters of the
Jews in the Netherlands died in the Holocaust. 47 Paradoxically, this
may have been because initially the Dutch fought harder. They were
better armed in 1940, and when invaded, they defended more fiercely and
were more soundly defeated. From the beginning in the Netherlands, the
relationship between the occupiers and the occupied was one of violent
confrontation, precluding the incessant moral demands that in Denmark
so disarmed the Nazis psychologically. In fact, when one considers what
could have happened in Denmark and in Czechoslovakia if violent means
had been used, nonviolent resistance can in some circumstances be seen
to be the only effective strategy against a totalitarian regime.
Those of us who were student radicals in the United States in the
1960's must admit that we were never as effective as the Czechoslovak
students of 1989.148 Not in our wildest dreams could we have imagined
bringing down a totalitarian government in two or three weeks, 149 even if
we had had a first-class intelligentsia to work with (which we certainly
did not). Nor-crippled by dilettantism and suburban piffie--would we
these methods, even the regime eventually begins to see that it has been so successful that there is
little any more to be paranoid about. Paradoxically, it is at this point that the regime becomes
vulnerable for the first time to a kind of resistance that would have been unthinkable when it felt less
secure.
146. ARENDT, EICHMANN, supra note 48, at 169.
147. Id. at 167-70.
148. Not all Czechoslovak students were active in this uprising. In fact, in several schools and
departments only a minority were. Because the children of Party members got preferential
admission to the university-even if they were in no way intellectually qualified for university
study-and because those same children could have expected similar treatment for the rest of their
lives, many were simply too indebted to the status quo to ask themselves hard questions about the
society in which they lived. And a number of students-content with the ease of study under poorly
qualified teachers who barely knew the material themselves-can be counted upon to resist
educational reforms that will introduce the demands from which deeper learning results.
149. Although the Czechslovak students were aware of what was happening elsewhere in East
Central Europe, the regime had at its disposal one of the most efficient secret police organizations in
the region, together with an army and a well trained regular police force-all equipped with armored
personnel carriers, tanks, crowd-control water cannons, and every other kind of hardware needed to
perpetuate itself. And the Massacre itself was hardly the kind of excess from which not even a
dictatorship can recover. Film of the Massacre shows an event no more shocking than any of
dozens, perhaps hundreds of confrontations between demonstrators and police in the United States
in the 1960's and 1970's.
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have been able to persuade a blue-collar class to take the terrible risks of
a treasonous general strike.
Why were the Czechoslovak students able to do it? To begin with,
they understood how people in the working class think. Revolutionists
are sometimes given their strongest assets by the very regimes they over-
throw. For the most part, the Czechoslovak students were themselves
the children of workers. (The regime went to enormous and often cruel
efforts to break the cycle, prevalent in every Western country, through
which bourgeois children go to university and working class children
learn trades.) For much the same reason, they could speak to the work-
ers as equals and in respectful and straightforward language that the
workers could understand (rather than in the condescending rhetoric we
might expect in a similar situation in the United States). Moreover, in
Czechoslovakia the working class has traditionally had a strong respect
for intellectual achievement, and thus the students spoke not only with
empathy but also with authority. And cultural values based on feelings
of solidarity had not been destroyed by normalization but had only gone
into quiet eclipse. Atomism seems to be a permanent part of American
culture, and more than one European has remarked that Americans find
it almost impossible to understand the concept of solidarity (which may
explain why the labor movement ultimately failed in this country).
When Czechoslovak students showed videotapes of the Massacre and
argued that workers should be able to see themselves and their children
in such scenes, the workers could not easily isolate themselves with the
rationalization that this was a problem affecting other people and with
which they did not choose to get involved. And finally, the students
fought all the harder because they could not afford to lose. Once they
shut down the universities, they knew that if the regime remained in
power they would all be purged and would face prison, a lifetime at
menial labor, or both.
VI. THE MIRROR1 50
One of the functions of comparativist analysis is to put a mirror to
ourselves, to see how we appear in a wider context where our assump-
tions and illusions can be revealed (and where occasionally something we
have taken for granted about ourselves turns out to be unique and praise-
worthy). When we look into the mirror created by what the British are
calling the Third Springtime of Nations, 5' what we see leaves us with-
among many other things-troubling questions about the way our uni-
versities are governed.
150. See supra notes 16-24 and accompanying text.
151. The first two were 1848-49 and 1918-19. See T. GARTON ASH, THE MAGIC LANTERN
passim (1990); Ascherson, The Borderlands, 30 GRANTA 41, 63 (1990).
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In the United States, boards of trustees were originally vested with the
ultimate authority to run colleges (and later, universities) because there
was no permanent professoriate in a frontier society and because the first
institutions of higher learning in America were founded by religious
denominations eager to control the content of instruction.152 Unable to
visit the campus regularly, trustees delegated the bulk of their authority,
either de facto or de jure, to the institution's president.15 a And when
state legislatures began to create public universities, they copied the
already existing structures of private schools.
The governance of universities by boards of lay people and their
appointees occurs only in the United States and Canada."5 4 It is incon-
sistent with the collegial governance that is a strength of American law
schools, and at some universities the dichotomy between university hier-
archical governance and law school collegial governance is a continual
source of friction and controversy. Although American faculties have
acquired some influence in practical ways over the running of universi-
ties-and although trustees and regents and their appointed presidents
and chancellors have at times exercised excellent leadership--the fact
remains that the system of placing the legal power to govern in boards of
outside lay people and their designated administrators has been "one of
the most decisive factors" in disrupting academic freedom and in inhib-
iting academic initiative in the United States. 55
Moreover, trustees and regents are predominantly businessmen who
believe that they and their appointed administrators-and not faculty-
should exercise the primary authority to appoint deans, determine
faculty leave policies, and make other academic decisions for which a
business background provides no special competence' 56 and may even
provide the opposite. It is a peculiarity of our national folklore that
"[t]he man who applies himself undeviatingly to pecuniary... gain, and
who is habitually... alert to the main chance," is assumed to be a source
of wisdom on all questions, even those outside his narrow and limited
152. HOFSTADTER & METZGER, supra note 14, at 114-208; R. PRATOR, THE COLLEGE
PRESIDENT, 3-4 (1963). "[In] Colonial America . . . teaching staff members seldom were
permanent.... Many college instructors were young tutors who themselves had recently graduated
and who had taken up teaching merely as temporary employment while waiting for other
positions.... [T]he president often would be one of the very few permanent members of a college
staff." PRATOR, supra, at 4 (1963).
153. PRATOR, supra note 152, at 3-4. Today, however, some of the increasing turnover among
university presidents and chancellors is partly traceable to the accumulating tendency of modern
boards to try to engage in active management of their universities. See N.Y. Times, July 25, 1990, at
B7, col. 1.
154. HOFSTADTER & METZGER, supra note 14, at 120.
155. Id. at 120-21. American politicians-unlike their counterparts in Europe-have
traditionally distrusted university teachers and have expected boards of regents to make sure that
public universities do not offend certain sensitive blocs of public opinion. See, e.g., UNIV. OF CALIF.
STUDY COMM'N ON UNIV. GOVERNANCE, THE CULTURE OF THE UNIVERSITY: GOVERNANCE
AND EDUCATION 59-61 (1968); Hartnett, supra note 18, at 25-26.
156. Hartnett, supra note 18, at 29-30.
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area of expertise.' 57 Thus, the Platonic ideal, "which would have the
philosophers take over the management of affairs, has been turned on its
head; the men of affairs have taken over the direction of the pursuit of
knowledge"' -in the process reducing each American faculty to "a
body of employ6s, hired to render certain services and turn out certain
scheduled vendible results."' 5 9
Although boards and their appointed administrators argue that lay
governance is essential to the raising of money, we have no idea-in the
absence of exhaustive empirical research-how much fund-raising is
actually conducted by trustees and regents and how much of it could just
as effectively be conducted by officials elected by and responsible to the
academic community. Many law schools already have to conduct their
own fund-raising without much assistance from trustees or regents. And
at some universities, the funds raised by governing boards have been so
meager and the efforts to raise them so insignificant as to present an
argument that the board members involved occupy an honorific position
with no material function other than to make decisions for which they
have no special qualifications. Although it has similarly been argued that
trustees and regents are needed to explain the university to and defend it
from a hostile world,' 60 the European experience amply demonstrates
that academics are quite capable of explaining and defending themselves.
In fact, they may be more capable than trustees and regents, who know
less about university life and, in the case of regents, often have other
loyalties influenced by politics.
Even worse are the arguments used to justify the exclusion of Ameri-
can faculty from voting membership on their own institutions' boards of
trustees or regents. The following, for example, are advanced by the
chancellor emeritus of a state university' 6': (1) In large universities, it
would be impractical to put even representative faculty on governing
boards. (But just that is done all over Europe, and British governing
boards are exactly the mixture of academics and lay people that is claimed
in America to be impossible.) (2) There are no reliable means of selecting
faculty for this purpose. (Elections have been used in Europe for a very
long time.) (3) Faculty do not have sufficient personal investment in the
157. VEBLEN, supra note 23, at 72.
158. Id. at 77-78.
159. Id. at 92. Many European symphony orchestras are by tradition self-governing. The
musicians themselves decide whom to hire as a conductor, and they elect (from their own
membership) officers and committees to whom they delegate administrative responsibilities.
American symphony orchestra musicians, by contrast, are mere employees who are relegated to
fighting with management through their unions. The traditions differ because European orchestras
were (and are) considered to be communities of artists entitled to autonomy, respect, and
government subsidies that keep ticket prices affordable, while American orchestras were founded by
wealthy patrons who treated musicians as servants.
160. Gould, Trustees and the University Community in THE UNIVERSITY AS AN ORGANIZATION
215, 216-18 (J. Perkins ed. 1973).
161. Gould, supra note 160, at 219-20.
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future of their universities. (But trustees and regents do?). (4) Faculty
on governing boards will advance their parochial interests at the expense
of the university as a whole. (That has hardly been the European
experience.)
Arguments like these are so easily refuted that one is left with the
feeling that there is really only one reason why faculty are not repre-
sented on American governing boards: the idea is simply repulsive to
trustees and regents and to their appointed presidents and chancellors,
who seem unable to view scholars as anything other than employees in
the industrial sense of the word.
The European system of university governance-the election by teach-
ers of the university's chief executive officer and its governing body (on
which teachers are themselves the voting majority)-is part of a system
of autonomy and self-government that for centuries has been considered
essential to intellectual integrity in an institutional sense. Hierarchy has
its uses, but in many of our institutions-in universities, frequently in
corporate life, even in symphony orchestras-it is relied upon unthink-
ingly and dysfunctionally. It may be no coincidence that in international
competition our corporations are often handicapped with inefficiencies
associated with rigidly hierarchical work environments. 62 And in uni-
versity governance, a hierarchical style may exacerbate or even cause
that which it is claimed to cure. 163 In many of those situations, it may in
fact be that we continue to use hierarchical structures because they are
ineffective. Hierarchy easily protects mediocrity from creative and com-
petitive pressures. It did exactly that in the regimes that have been swept
away in East Central Europe.
Especially when confronted with epic events, history prefers a long
and patient wait to gain the advantage of perspective before passing judg-
ment. While those events happen, one can only stand agape, entertaining
the most tentative of inferences. But in the struggle to determine the
form of governance that eventually will take hold in some of the East
Central European countries, an influential-although perhaps not ulti-
mately controlling-body of opinion wants something that in many small
ways is more democratic and less disingenuous than the system and prac-
tices we take for granted. People who have risen up against one kind of
hierarchy do not eagerly accept the imposition of another simply because
it wears different clothing. " It may be that in the United States we have
162. See, e.g., R. PASCALE & A. ATHOS, THE ART OF JAPANESE MANAGEMENT (1981).
163. The stress that increasingly burns out and demoralizes American university presidents and
chancellors may be aggravated by their continual obligation, under current systems of governance,
to conciliate factious constituencies that at present are able to assert their interests only through
conflict with each other and with university administrators. See N.Y. Times, July 25, 1990, at B7,
col. 1 (more frequent turnover among university presidents and chancellors makes these positions
increasingly difficult to fill). But insightfully designed sharing of responsibility can itself generate
conciliation in situations that otherwise would deteriorate into acrimony.
164. "IBM certainly works better than the Skoda plant, but that doesn't alter the fact that both
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made some poorly considered assumptions about the extent to which
hierarchy is associated with effectiveness and the extent to which we
actually experience democracy in everyday life. Certainly, we have some
hard questions to answer when we are confronted with university teach-
ers in East Central Europe who revert after the fall of totalitarian
regimes to previously traditional democratic prerogatives that are
unheard of in the United States.
companies have long since ... turned man into a little cog in their machinery.... [Tihe fact that
IBM is capitalist, profit-oriented, and efficient, while Skoda is socialist, money-losing, and inefficient,
seems secondary to me." HAVEL, DISTURBING THE PEACE, supra note 7, at 14.
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